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CHILD, PARENT, STATE, AND THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE: AN
ESSAY ON THE SUPREME
COURT'S RECENT WORK
JOHN H. GARVEY*
More than a half a century ago the Supreme Court first suggested that
the Constitution affords minors, as well as adults, certain rights which
must be protected.' Since that time the Court has spelled out the ex-
tent of that protection. It has concluded that a child has, among others,
rights to equal protection against discrimination because of race2 or
illegitimacy,3 to the safeguards of due process in both criminal4 and
civil5 contexts, and to freedom of speech.6 The recognition that chil-
dren are mentally, physically, and emotionally different from adults in
ways which lawmakers may justifiably recognize has, quite rightly,
proven no obstacle to the enforcement of those guarantees.
The extension of constitutional rights to minors becomes more dif-
ficult when the state attempts to regulate juvenile behavior, or to decide
who should have custody of a child. The greater complexity of these
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. A.B., 1970, Notre
Dame; J.D., 1974, Harvard University.
1. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (dictum). The Court, in striking down
a state law that banned the teaching of German in elementary schools, found that "the legislature
has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modem language teachers, with the op-
portunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education
of their own." Id.
2. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); text accompanying notes 23-27
infra.
3. See note 28 and accompanying text infra.
4. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy); Inre Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (reasonable doubt standard); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (notice, counsel, cross-exami-
nation, self-incrimination); text accompanying notes 29-51 infra.
5. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); text accompanying notes 52-76 infra.
6. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969); Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory pledge of allegiance to the flag violates first and four-
teenth amendments); text accompanying notes 77-88 infra.
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last cases can be traced to two related factors. First, excluding the ar-
eas of behavior regulation and custody, limits can usually be set to con-
tain state intervention without taking consideration of the incapacity of
children, up to a certain age, to make their own decisions. Second,
governmental action in the area of behavior regulation and custody can
have considerable impact on the parent-child relation.
Until quite recently, questions concerning the permissibility of
state control over juvenile behavior or custody have been treated as
problems ultimately and uniquely involving the issue of parental rights:
if there are limits on what the state may do, it is because those who
have primary control over the child have an interest, protected by the
due process clause, in making decisions on the child's behalf. During
the past two Terms, however, one group of cases has indicated that the
child himself has rights which may limit state intervention even when it
is exercised in support of parental choices. In Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth7 and Bellotti v. Baird8 the Court stated
that the state could not condition a minor's right to an abortion on
parental consent.9 In Carey v. Population Services Znternationa4 10 the
Court indicated that a state may neither prohibit children from procur-
ing contraceptives, nor leave the decision with the parents. In both
situations the child's right of "privacy," protected by the due process
clause, was found to outweigh whatever interest parents and state
might have in proscribing a contrary course of conduct. I
All three decisions seem to acknowledge the possibility that the
child whose right is being protected against a parent-state coalition will
not be competent to decide whether to exercise the right. The necessity
for judicial assistance in this eventuality might be easier to justify if the
intervention were characterized as upholding the child's best interests
against an irrational or selfish assertion of otherwise protected parental
prerogatives. But the intervention coexists uneasily with the Court's
simultaneous recognition that the interest in familial privacy protected
by the due process clause is not strictly parental, but relational-a right
held by parent and child alike. Last Term, in Smith v. Organization of
Foster Familiesfor Equality and Reform'2 (OFFER) and Moore v. Ciy
7. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
8. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
9. Danforlh, 428 U.S. at 72-75; Belloul, 428 U.S. at 151.
10. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
11. See id. at 692-99.
12. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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of East Cleveland"3 the Court for the first time explicitly indicated that
the child was protected by the due process clause against at least some
forms of state interference with the family structure because of his in-
terest in receiving parental guidance. 14 There thus results a collision of
two claims, both of which have been circulating in the foggy ambiance
of due process "privacy": the child's right to autonomous development,
and the child's right to receive the benefits of parental control.
This Article will suggest that the right of autonomy, which limits
state control over children, should be considered to reside not in the
child alone, but in the family, just as the right against state interference
with the family structure resides in the family. The shift in focus from
children's rights to family rights implicitly accounts for the mental,
physical, and emotional differences between children and adults.
Moreover, protecting a family's right of autonomy insures that deci-
sions on behalf of the child will be made by those presumptively best
able to make such decisions, the parents.
I. THE CHILD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, AND THE ROLE OF
MATURITY
Unquestionably the most infectious source of confusion plaguing at-
tempts to consider the limits of permissible state control over juvenile
behavior has been the assumption that one constitutional right is just
like another--that while the child may not be entitled to the full force
of any, he at least is entitled to the benefits of each to the same extent.
This assumption was a factor critical to the results in both Danforth1
5
and Carey."6 To be sure, each case, in concluding that minors' rights
13. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
14. See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 850-54; Moore, 431 U.S. at 499, 503-06; text accompanying
notes 199-243 infra.
15. The Court stated.
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. See, e.g., Breed v.Jones, 421 U. S. 519
(1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines SchoolDist., 393 U. S.
503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967).
428 U.S. at 74-75.
16. "'[W]hatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 431 U.S. at 692 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13). Justice
Brennan summarized the rights of minors in a footnote:
EMinors are entitled to constitutional protection for freedom of speech, Tinker v. Des
Maoines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969); West Virginia Bd ofEducation v. Barnette,
319 U. S. 624 (1943); equal protection against racial discrimination, Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); due process in civil contexts, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S.
565 (1975); and a variety of rights of defendants in criminal proceedings, including the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970),
1978]
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were entitled to somewhat less stringent protection than the corre-
sponding rights of adults,' 7 declared that the state has broader author-
ity to regulate the "activities"'" or "conduct"' 9 of children than it does
with respect to adults. The Court did not consider, however, whether
the state has broader authority to regulate the behavior of minors than
it does to interfere with other rights minors may have.20 Litigation in
the lower courts on the issues presented in Danforth and Carey re-
vealed a similar willingness to lump together the lot of rights which
have been recognized for children.
2'
This tendency ignores the effect which a child's competence or ma-
turity has, or should have, on the process of selective incorporation of
rights for children. It is suggested below that the cases cited by
Danforth and Carey 22 can be reconciled with the proposition that age
and maturity are relevant to recognition of children's rights. Never-
theless, at this stage it can at least be said that the great majority of
cases extending the protection of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
the prohibition of double jeopardy, Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975), the rights to
notice, of counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination, and not to incriminate oneself,
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967), and the protection against coerced confessions, Gallegos
v. Colorado, 370 U. S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948).
Id. at 692 n.14.
17. The Court in Danforth stated that restrictions on the minor's right to an abortion could
be justified only if there were some "significant state interest. . . not present in the case of an
adult." 428 U.S. at 75; accord, Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 & n.15.
18. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
19. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15 (Brennan, J.).
20. Justice Brennan's opinion in Carey did suggest that restrictions on a minor's right to
acquire contraceptives might warrant a less rigorous review than the "compelling state interest"
test applied to restrictions on the privacy of adults, because "the law has generally regarded mi-
nors as having a lesser capability for making important decisions." Id. That recognition, how-
ever, did not inhibit him from concluding that the minor's privacy interest was a "fundamental
right," id. at 696, 697 n.22, and hence presumably entitled to as stringent protection as any right a
minor might have.
21. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 566-67 (E.D. Pa.
1975); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 904, 530 P.2d 260, 263 (1975); In re P.J., 12 Crim. L. Rep.
2549 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973); cf Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789-91 (5th Cir. 1975) (common
law did not distinguish between mature teenagers and infants but treated both as the property of
the parents); Pilpel & Zuckerman, Abortlon and /he Rights ofMinors, 23 CAse W. Res. L. REV.
779, 795-96 (1972) (concluding that since minors are "persons" they are entitled to the protections
of the Bill of Rights); Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights ofMinors: the Con-
traceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1008-10 (1975) ("[t]he Court appears to have de-
termined that. . . capacity is not relevant in determining applicability of fundamental rights to
minors").' A refreshing deviation from the trend is offered in Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez: Student
Status as Suspect Classfication?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 627, 641-43 (1977) (arguing that some constitu-
tional rights should hinge on possession of adult competency).
22. See notes 1-6 supra.
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amendment to minors do not necessarily control when the issue is regu-
lation of behavior.
A. EQUAL PROTECTION
The best established, and virtually unquestioned, extension of constitu-
tional rights to minors is the application of the equal protection clause
to school desegregation cases. Where the only question is whether the
state has power to impose racial separation, it is difficult to maintain
that an affirmative answer is made more acceptable by the youth of the
students. In fact, the rationale of Brown v. Board of Education23 may be
taken to indicate just the contrary. In concluding that segregation de-
prived minority children of equal educational opportunities, the Court
stressed that separation "'generates a feeling of inferiority,' "24 which
in turn "'affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with
the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educa-
tional and mental development of negro children . . "25 If we were
to suppose that the institution of segregation were confined to those
who had reached majority, then it would seem to follow from the
Court's reasoning that the effects might-at least in the aspects men-
tioned-be less serious. Put another way, denial of equal protection in
the context of school segregation has effects which vary inversely,
rather than directly, with age. In this respect, the right at stake is quite
different from, for example, the right to make political speeches, where
the severity of the deprivation would seem to vary with the intelligence
or concern of the speaker.
Another perspective on this difference is afforded when one real-
izes that the fundamental interests strand of contemporary equal pro-
tection analysis has never required parity of treatment between
children and adults.26 If it did, of course, it would provide a bootstrap
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. Id. at 494 (quoting finding of court in Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D.
Kan. 1951)).
25. Id.
26. It has been suggested, however, that such a reading of the equal protection clause would
be desirable. See, e.g., Schulz & Cohen, Isolationism in Juvenile Court Jurisprudence, in PUtSU-
ING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 20, 35-37 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976); Pilpel & Zuckerman, supra note
21, at 801-04. A modified form of the equal protection argument is proposed in Letwin, supra
note 21, at 655-62. Justice Black has suggested that it would "be a plain denial of equal protection
of the laws--an invidious discrimination--to hold that ... children [could] be denied [the] same
constitutional safeguards" afforded adults in criminal prosecutions. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 61
(concurring opinion). The position, however, was not one which Black was willing to apply
across the board. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515-16 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
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technique for applying the Bill of Rights to children in a wholesale
manner, rather than by the piecemeal process of incorporation which
the Court has followed. What Brown and its progeny hold is that one
child should be treated like another of the same age, not that the child's
right to acquire knowledge is coextensive with an adult's.27
Much the same can be said of the other situation in which the
equal protection clause has been employed to protect the rights of mi-
nors: protection of the illegitimate child's right to receive financial sup-
port on the same terms as legitimate children.28 Not only is the
severity of the deprivation likely to vary inversely with age (after a cer-
tain time the child can support himself), but the Court's conclusion
amounts to no more than a declaration that children must be treated
like one another, not like adults.
B. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: JUVENILE COURT ADJUDICATION
The extent of constitutional protection to which the minor is entitled
has also been the subject of heated debate in the Court's recent consid-
eration of the procedural safeguards required in the juvenile court ad-
judication process. In re Gault29 held that a constitutional right to
notice, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination, and a privilege
against self-incrimination" existed for juveniles facing possible incar-
ceration as a result of delinquency charges. In re Winshp, 31 decided 3
years later, held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required
when a juvenile was charged with an act that would be a crime if com-
mitted by an adult. Most recently, Breed v. Jones32 concluded that the
27. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), seems in fact to settle this latter matter by
holding that a child has no right to read scatological material for which an adult could claim first
amendment protection.
28. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (disallowance of intestate succession
from father); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (denial of Social Security benefits to
some illegitimate children of disabled parents); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill,
411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam) (denial of state welfare assistance to most families with illegiti-
mate children); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (denial of judicially enforceable right of
support from natural father); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (claims of
unacknowledged illegitimate children to workmen's compensation for death of parent
subordinated to claims of legitimate children); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (denial to
illegitimates of right to sue for wrongful death of parent); cf. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab,
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (denial to parents of illegitimate of right to sue for wrongful death of
child).
29. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
30. The privilege against self-incrimination was first recognized in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596 (1948). See also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
31. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
32. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). Between Gault and Breed, the Court held that a jury trial was not
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double jeopardy clause prevents prosecution in criminal court after an
adjudicatory proceeding in juvenile court.
Gault and Winship might be taken to stand for the apparently in-
nocuous proposition that the individual's interest in the protections of
procedural due process is not age-dependent. Put another way, these
cases might be read as standing for the following principles:3" (1) The
concern of the fifth 4 and sixth35 amendments, as augmented and ap-
plied to the states by the fourteenth amendment due process clause,3 6 is
to avoid "inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of
remedy";37 and (2) whatever additional control a state may have over a
child's liberty, youth does not justify a denial of due process which re-
sults in a mistaken or unfair deprivation of any interest.
38
In fact the matter is more complex, largely because it is wrong to
suppose, as this interpretation does, that any "liberty" interest, however
minute, deserves the maximum possible protection against the chance
of mistaken infringement. Invoking full due process protection will
always involve costs, and the decision to impose those costs must al-
ways balance them against the nature of the right being protected. 9
Ultimately, Gault and Winship involve the question whether a juve-
nile has the same interest in avoiding commitment to a state institution
required for adjudication of delinquency charges. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551
(1971).
33. The suggestion that the procedural due process cases may be analyzed in the fashion
suggested in the text is advanced in Letwin, supra note 21, at 642.
34. The privilege against self-incrimination.
35. The rights to counsel, notice, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses.
36. Winship held that the right to have guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt, although
not explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, is protected by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 397 U.S. at 364.
37. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 19-20.
38. Indeed, if we start from the premise that children and adults have the same right to avoid
the mistaken deprivation of any kind of freedom, it would seem that the child has an even better
claim to the protection of counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination, given his lack of
maturity and understanding. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 38 n.65 ("'The most informal and
well-intentioned of judicial proceedings are technical; few adults without legal training can influ-
ence or even understand them; certainly children cannot' ") (quoting THE PRESIDENTr'S COMMIS-
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusT=CE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY 86 (1967)), 45 (" 'What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a
mature man were involved. And when ... a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before
us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used' ") (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,
599 (1948) (Douglas, J.)).
39. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674-76 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
334-35 (1976). This decision is, fundamentally, no different from the decision to invoke the pro-
tection of substantive due process. See generally Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as
School Superintendent, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 25, 52-75.
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as does an adult, and hence whether the youth deserves the same pro-
tection against an erroneous decision. To trace the matter back to the
Constitution, the issue is whether some different process is "due" the
juvenile because "liberty" means something different for him than it
does for an adult.4°
This abstract proposition is one which the Court in Gault and
Winship, for all its talk about the "debatable" "constitutional and theo-
retical basis" for the juvenile court system, 41 did not deny.42  Several
good reasons may account for this silence. First, it is surely less offen-
sive to control the child's freedom to act as he pleases, even if he has
not misbehaved, than it is to control an adult's. The child has less self-
direction with regard to socially acceptable behavior, while the adult
need only be constrained post hoc in the public interest. Moreover, the
child's perception of the privation will likely be quite different from the
adult's, since the satisfaction which comes from setting and accom-
plishing one's own objectives depends in some measure on the individ-
ual's intellectual and emotional development.
Second, there was an implied recognition in Gault that, even if
control of the child's behavior might be warranted, it matters a great
deal who exercises the control, because the parents also have an inter-
est in the fair adjudication of any charges against their child. Notice
must be provided not only for the sake of the offender, but also because
"his parents' right to his custody [is] at stake."'4 3  Not only the child,
but "his parents must be notified" of the right to counsel, which be-
40. The suggestion that "liberty," as the term is employed in the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, might have a different and more restricted meaning when ap-
plied to children, as opposed to adults, need not, of course, entail an acceptance of "the gradual
process of exclusion" of adult rights from those clauses, on which the Supreme Court has recently
embarked. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "'roperty, " 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977). Even
if the term "liberty" is read as broadly as possible to include the rights "to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,"
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), it remains true that the protection extended to
children by the common law was less extensive than that recognized for adults. See, e.g., Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659-63 (1977) (corporal punishment of students). Meyer itself, after
all, in holding that a state could not forbid the teaching of foreign languages in elementary school,
relied on the rights of parents and teachers, not of students. See 262 U.S. at 399-401; text accom-
panying notes 15-22 supra.
41. Ire Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. But see Id. at 66 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (characterizing majority's premise as "the product of reasoning which is not de-
scribed").
42. See Schultz & Cohen, supra note 26, at 22-24.
43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33-34. The Court seemed to contemplate the possibility that the
parents could, in some circumstances, waive the requirement of notice. Id. at 34 n.54.
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longs to both parent and child." Further, the validity of a waiver of the
privilege against self-incrimination depends not only on the age of the
child, but on "the presence and competence of parents. '45  From one
perspective then, Gault and Winship can be taken to stand for the
proposition that the state cannot disrupt the relation of parent and
child without the exercise of considerable caution; this idea is opposed
to the notion that the child has any traditional kind of "liberty" interest
protected by the due process clause.4 6
Third, even if the state's authority to control the behavior of ado-
lescents were coextensive with the authority possessed by their parents,
the procedural protections invoked by Gault and Winshop might still be
appropriate. The fond hopes of the architects of the juvenile court sys-
tem have proven completely chimerical; the "claimed benefits of the
juvenile process"-reduction of recidivism through good training dur-
ing commitment, avoidance of the stigma attendant upon criminal con-
victions, confidentiality with regard to disposition, and compassionate
consideration by the court-have simply not materialized.47 Even if
one assumes that a child's sensitivity to the real effects of an unfounded
conviction are diminished in proportion to his lack of understanding,
the consequences will still be with him years later when he will appreci-
ate them, although at that time he will be unable to do anything about
them. Given that government agencies, and even private employers,
may have access to court and police records of juvenile proceedings,
that the child's development is likely to be significantly impaired as a
result of commitment, and that the term "delinquent" "has come to
involve only slightly less stigma than the term 'criminal' applied to
adults, '48 the only way to protect the juvenile's future interest in avoid-
ing the mistaken infliction of those consequences is by the present im-
position of due process requirements.49
44. Id. at 41-42. Again, the Court indicated that the parent alone might be able to waive
the right. Id. at 42.
45. Id. at 55. See generally Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications and Conclusive Pre-
sumptions: Three Linked Riddles, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1975, at 8, 12-13 n.14.
46. The role of the parents is highlighted by the Court's statement in Gault:
Under traditional notions, one would assume that in a case like that of Gerald Gault,
where the juvenile appears to have a home, a working mother and father, and an older
brother, the Juvenile Judge would have made a careful inquiry and judgment as to the
possibility that the boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home, despite his previous
transgressions.
387 U.S. at 28.
47. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66; In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21-27.
48. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 23-25.
49. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), supports the suggestion that Gault and
Winsh p turn in part on the necessity of protecting the claims of the adult-to-be against mistaken
1978]
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Upon close examination, the application of double jeopardy re-
quirements mandated in Breed v. Jones may be seen to rest on similar
principles. The possibility of transfer from a juvenile court to a court
of general criminal jurisdiction once adjudicatory proceedings have be-
gun puts the defendant in a difficult position. If he chooses to cooper-
ate in the hope of compassionate consideration from the juvenile court,
and the case is then transferred, he will not only have given the prose-
cution a preview of his defense, but may also have made inculpatory
statements-later admissible against him-under the misapprehension
of assisting his disposition as a juvenile offender. On the other hand, if
he chooses to remain silent in anticipation of transfer, he runs the risk
of not having the case transferred, and thereby losing the opportunity
to present his case, as well as prejudicing his chances for lenient treat-
ment by appearing uncooperative.50 In either eventuality there exists
the risk that the state will intervene unfairly. Moreover, in both cases
the convicted juvenile will have received penalties, the enduring effect
of which he will be unable to undo upon reaching maturity. 51
interference. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion, in distinguishing Gault and Winshop, stated
that those cases emphasized "factfmding procedures. The requirements of notice, counsel, con-
frontation, cross-examination, and standard of proof naturally flowed from this emphasis. But one
cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfmding,"
Id. at 543. Justice White's concurrence began: "Although the function of the jury is to find facts,
that body is not necessarily or even probably better at the job than the conscientious judge." Id. at
551. Moreover, the other ends which are served by a jury trial, preventing "abuses of official
power" and providing a "hedge against corrupt, biased, or political justice," id., may become
irrelevant as the age of the offender diminishes. "Reprehensible acts by juveniles are not deemed
the consequence of mature and malevolent choice but of environmental pressures (or the lack of
them) or of other forces beyond their control." The juvenile court system has built in "an opera-
tive force against prejudice and short-tempered justice." Id. at 551-52; cf. Id. at 550 (opinion of
Blackmun, J.) (juvenile court system contemplates paternalistic attention).
50. See 421 U.S. at 540-41; Carr, The Effect of the Double Jeopardy Clause on Juvenile
Proceedings, 6 U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 52-54 (1974); Note, Double Jeopardy and the Waiver of Jurisdc-
lion in Calfiornia'r Juvenile Courts, 24 STAN. L. Rav. 874, 902 n.137 (1972).
51. It is true that one major objective of the prohibition against multiple trials is the avoid-
ance of a double imposition of the "pressures and burdens-psychological, physical, and finan-
cial-on a person charged." 421 U.S. at 530. Also, it is not irrational to suppose that the effects
of double jeopardy are more attenuated on the very young, who may not appreciate the potential
consequences, and do not bear the costs of their own defense. Thus, Breed's recognition of a
child's right to the protection of the double jeopardy clause might be taken as some support for the
proposition that the Bill of Rights shields any individual regardless of age or maturity.
A possible response, adopted by the Court in Breed, is that an adjudicatory hearing does
engender "elements of 'anxiety and insecurity' in a juvenile, and imposes a 'heavy personal
strain.'" 421 U.S. at 530-31 (citation omitted); see Snyder, The Impact of the Juvenile Court
Hearing on the Child, 17 CRnim & DELINQUENCY 180 (1971). Perhaps more important, though,
is the fact that the very context in which the question arises virtually removes the issue from the
area of children's rights. Jeopardy attaches for the second time when the offender has been trans-
ferred to a court of general criminal jurisdiction. In California, for example, if the minor was 16
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C. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
A third current topic concerning the constitutional rights of minors has
been the applicability of procedural due process to school disciplinary
proceedings. Recently, Goss v. Lopez"2 held that suspension from high
school could not be imposed without some kind of notice and hear-
ing.53  On the other hand, Ingraham v. Wright, 4 decided just last
Term, concluded that corporal punishment in public schools need not
be preceded by notice and hearing. 5 Both cases recognize that the
student has "property" and "liberty" interests which are implicated in
school disciplinary measures, 56 but together they may be taken to stand
for the proposition that the extent of protection those rights deserve is
determined to a significant degree by the youth and immaturity of the
individual.5 7
Whether the immediate impact of suspension on the student af-
fected is serious enough to warrant a requirement of notice and a hear-
ing may bequestioned. As Justice Powell suggested in his dissent in
Goss, a 10-d.y dismissal might provide a welcome mid-semester break
and, depending on the student's circle of friends, might enhance rather
than tarnish the offender's reputation .5  Nevertheless, suspension may
entail consequences which the child does not appreciate, but which are
both enduring and uniformly recognized in the adult world as undesir-
able. For one thing, suspension interrupts the child's education;59 for
another, a record of suspension, however unjustified, may result in the
denial of future employment or of admission to institutions of higher
or older at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and if the court, after hearing evi-
dence, "concludes that the minor would not be amenable to the care, treatment and training pro-
gram available through the facilities of the juvenile court," the juvenile may be tried in an adult
court. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1978).
52. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
53. Id. at 581-83; accord, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
54. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
55. Id. at 672-82.
56. Goss suggested two such rights: a property interest in a public education, and a liberty
interest in avoiding the erroneous sustaining and recording of charges which "could seriously
damage the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with
later opportunities for higher education and employment." 419 U.S. at 574-75 & n.7.
57. Unlike the adjudication process in juvenile court, the imposition of discipline in public
schools does not implicate, to any important degree, the relation between child and parent. Thus,
whatever protection is given students under the due process clause must ultimately be referable to
rights which they can claim unassisted by the interest in familial ties and direction. Ingraham,
430 U.S. at 662 & n.22; Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
58. 419 U.S. at 598-99 n.19.
59. But see id. at 589 (suspension of 8 days will "rarely affect a pupil's ... scholastic per-
formance").
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education °.6  The interest in avoiding these detriments, whether the
child appreciates them or not, is one which quite properly should not
vary with age.6
The interest in avoiding the unjustified imposition of corporal
punishment is different in nature from the interest against suspension.
The individual petitioners in Ingraham v. Wright were eighth and
ninth grade students at a junior high school in Dade County, Florida,
who had been paddled apparently more severely than was permitted
either by local school board regulations or by state law.6 2  Seeking
damages on their own behalf, and declaratory and injunctive relief on
behalf of all Dade County students, the students sued a number of
school officials, claiming deprivation of their rights to procedural and
60. Goss did note that § 513 of the Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat.
571, (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1976)) (adding § 438 to the General Education Provisions
Act), precluded release of student records to employers without parental consent. Under that
section, however, records may still be released to other schools, and although parents are permit-
ted to challenge the inclusion of inaccurate or misleading information, it is not clear that a parent
can contest the underlying basis for a suspension. 419 U.S. at 575 n.7.
The immediate alternative to the Court's requirement of notice and a hearing was review
under Ohio's general administrative review statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2506.01 (Supp.
1973). The Court found the code inadequate because it did not provide for de nova review and
suspension could not be stayed pending hearing. 419 U.S. at 581-82 n.10.
61. Suspension or dismissal from school for academic reasons will, of course, have conse-
quences at least as severe as those accompanying suspension for misconduct. The basis for the
Court's recent conclusion that due process does not require a formal hearing in such cases, Board
of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978), is the countervailing weight accorded the nature of
the inquiry, which is necessarily more "subjective and evaluative" than the typical disciplinary
question and is not conducive to adversarial determination. Id. at 955.
62. Ingraham's testimony, which the district court accepted as credible for purposes of its
ruling on a motion to dismiss, related that he had been hit 20 times with a wooden paddle, result-
ing in a hematoma which required medical attention and kept him out of school for I 1 days.
Andrews testified that he had been hit on the arms on two occasions, and was deprived of the full
use of one arm for a week. 430 U.S. at 657.
At the time the incidents ocbured, Florida law provided: "[A teacher] shall not inflict corporal
punishment before consulting the principal or teacher in charge of the school, and in no case shall
such punishment be degrading or unduly severe in its nature." FLA. STAT. § 232.27 (1975)
(amended 1977). Dade County School Board Policy 5144, effective during the 1970o71 school
year, provided:
Corporal punishment. . . is administered as a means of changing the behavior of the
student ....
Corporal punishment may be used in the case where other means of seeking cooper-
ation from the student have failed.... The punishment must be administered in kind-
ness and in the presence of another adult, at a time and under conditions not calculated
to hold the student up to ridicule or shame.
In the administering of corporal punishment, no instrument shall be used that will
produce physical injury to the student, and no part of the body above the waist or below
the knees may be struck.
Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 254-55 n.5 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on rehearing, 525 F.2d 909
(1976), affrd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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substantive due process, and infliction of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The district court's dismissal was ultimately affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit en banc,6" and by the Supreme
Court.
6 4
Addressing itself to the procedural due process claim, Justice Pow-
ell's majority opinion first indicated that a student had no "liberty"
interest in avoiding corporal punishment administered within the limits
of the common law privilege afforded teachers who "reasonably [be-
lieve their actions] to be necessary for the child's discipline or train-
ing.",65 Although a student did have a constitutional claim against
unprivileged punishment, prior notice and hearing requirements would
not significantly increase the protection already afforded by Florida's
tort law and criminal penalties.6 6 Moreover, "even if the need for ad-
vance procedural safeguards were clear,"'67 to impose them would "en-
tail a significant intrusion into an area of primary educational
responsibility," 68 and afford protection that was not "appropriate to the
constitutional interests at stake.
69
This Article has suggested that the protection of the due process
clause might have been extended to delinquency and school suspension
cases not simply because the individuars interest in avoiding the mis-
taken imposition of any penalties might not vary with age, but also
because the sanctions in those cases had enduring consequences which
the child was entitled to avoid regardless of his age or maturity. By
contrast, a mistaken imposition of corporal punishment has fewer long-
term effects: the pain is present, and of short duration.
Since, presumably, the young feel pain just as acutely as adults do,
it might fairly be asked why the child does not have a "liberty" interest
in avoiding the infliction of pain that is at least coextensive with that of
an adult. That he does not is made clear by the fact that the law has
long carved out privileges-notwithstanding the equal protection and
due process clauses-for those, including state employees, who disci-
pline children.70 The justification for these privileges has traditionally
63. 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
64. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
65. Id. at 677; see id. at 676-77 & n.45.
66. Id. at 677-79.
67. Id. at 680.
68. Id. at 672.
69. Id. at 683 n.55.
70. Parents are liable neither in tort or under criminal law for punishments that they reason-
ably believe to be in the child's best interest. Teachers have similar privileges both under corn-
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been that, until the individual's rational and ethical faculties are fully
developed, physical discipline is an effective means of signaling unac-
ceptable conduct.7 1 Because the imposition of pain is not for retribu-
tion, but rather for providing information, the fact that somebody else
"did it" is not necessarily controlling. Though we do not generally
spank children when they have done nothing wrong, mistakenly spank-
ing Johnnie, who was only with Billy when Billy "did it," may keep
Johnnie out of trouble the next time. And unlike suspension, spanking
has no long-term consequences comparable to the interruption of edu-
cation or the entering of a permanent and harmful record.72
The scope of the common law privilege recognizes this by provid-
ing immunity for the use of physical force not only when Johnnie "did
it," but also when the teacher reasonably believes the discipline is nec-
essary for Johnnie's proper control, training, or education.7 3 Obvi-
ously then, due process affords a child less protection from the use of
physical force than it does an adult, whose behavior the state has no
right to try to improve without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a
clearly designated offense has been committed, The nature of the lib-
erty interest which the child does possess helps to explain why the
Ingraham Court refused to require prior notice and a hearing before a
teacher imposes corporal punishment.74 In this case, unlike the suspen-
sion situation, the issue at any hearing would be not whether the child
had done the act, but the reasonableness of the teacher's belief. Not
mon law and by statute. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 662-63 nn.23, 28 (citations of
cases and statutes); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (McKinney 1967) (providing an exemption for par-
ents and teachers for actions that would otherwise be classified as intentional torts); MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 3.07(1) (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962) (no criminal liability-parents); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(1) (1965) (parental tort exemption); id. §§ 147(2), 153(2)
(same--teachers); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453; 3 id. at *120; W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 27 (4th ed. 1971) (same-both).
71. See, e.g., 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.20 (1956); Proehl, Tort
Liabiliy of Teachers, 12 VAND. L. REv. 723, 727-28 (1959); Sumption, The Control f Pupil Con-
duct by the School, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 80, 85 (1955).
72. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 674 n.43.
There is, of course, one school of thought with numerous and distinguished adherents which
contends that the psychological consequences of corporal punishment may be both damaging and
enduring. See, e.g., A. LEVINE & E. CARY, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS 84-86 (rev. ed. 1977).
Given the overwhelming background of historical and contemporary approval of reasonable cor-
poral punishment, however, it would be stretching the point to suggest that these mere conjectures
bring the child's claim against physical discipline within even the broadest reading of due process
"liberty"--"those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see note 40 supra.
73. See note 70 supra.
74. 430 U.S. at 659-63, 670-71.
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only is that issue inherently less susceptible to on-the-spot proof,75 but
it is also one that requires some third party, besides the teacher and the
student, to make the decision.76 This added burden, given the already
unlikely prospect of completely arbitrary action by the teacher, may
have been the deciding factor.
Read together, Goss and Ingraham indicate that the due process
to which a child is entitled depends to a significant extent on the nature
of the right being protected. When the severity of the consequences the
child will suffer is unrelated to youth or immaturity, there is no reason
to afford juveniles fewer procedural safeguards than would be due
adults. When, on the other hand, the impact which even an unjustified
invasion of personal security is likely to have varies significantly with
the individuars stage of growth, the protection afforded by constitu-
tional rights should vary as well.
D. FREE SPEECH
The strongest support for the proposition that the protections of the Bill
of Rights should be extended uniformly, if not with full force, to
children is provided by Tinker v. Des Moines School District.7 7 The
Tinker Court held that several students-ages 13, 15, and 16-in public
schools had a right protected by the first amendment free speech
clause7 ' to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. It is
difficult to dispute that the individual's interest in expressing political
views is one that grows with his awareness of political issues, and with
a perception of the importance of participation in public debate. Yet
the Tinker Court made no distinction with respect to the strength of the
rights asserted by the 13-year-old and the 16-year-old. Justice Stewart,
concurring, went so far as to accuse the Court of uncritically assuming
that, "school discipline aside, the First Amendment rights of children
are coextensive with those of adults."
79
75. In Goss, the Court contemplated that in the case of suspension, "the disciplinarian may
informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred." 419
U.S. at 582.
76. A teacher might be capable of determining, without bias, whether the student accused of
the punishable act had in fact committed it. It is difficult, however, to suppose that a teacher
could make an independent determination of the reasonableness of his belief that punishment was
"necessary for [the child's] proper control, training, or education." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 147(2) (1965).
77. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
78. The free speech guarantees of the first amendment are extended to the states by the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
79. 393 U.S. at 515.
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As the Court suggested, one possible justification for that assump-
tion is that the child's ultimate selection of values and ideas will be
made from the variety offered for his inspection at an early age, so that
restriction of debate during early years results in thought control over
the future adult." But such an argument merely presents the same
issue from a different perspective. If it is true that the individual's
interest in expressing ideas varies with his awareness of issues and com-
mitment to values-increases with cognitive and affective growth-the
same would seem to be true of the right to receive ideas. Put another
way, the underlying premise of the commitment to the free market of
ideas is that those arguments of most persuasive force will ultimately be
valued highest and drive out competing concepts. This premise, how-
ever, assumes on the part of those who enter the market an ability to
appreciate persuasive force, which the very young may not possess.
This is not to suggest that the outcome in Tinker is wrong, but
rather that the Court failed to articulate the crucial role played by the
students' parents. As Justice Black noted in his dissent, the Tinker
children's father was "a Methodist minister without a church. . . paid
a salary by the American Friends Service Committee," and the mother
of the 16-year-old was "an official in the Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom."'" The students' decision to wear
armbands, according to the Court, was reached at a meeting of both
adults and students, and the petitioners' parents concurred in the deci-
sion. 82 In those circumstances the students' right to advocate a partic-
ular position gains considerably more strength, having behind it not
merely the weight of childish ratiocination and commitment, but also
the support of parental counsel on which the students quite justifiably
are entitled to rely. It is not merely "a symbolic battle between adults,
each using children as sacrificial pawns,"83 for the children do have an
interest in the matter. But that interest is inextricably bound up in
familial ties: it is the right to be brought up, and to behave despite state
objection, in a way the parents have experienced and found valuable.84
80. This proposition seems to underlie the Court's reference to the child's right at an early
age to enter the free market of ideas: "The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."' Id. at 512 (quoting Keyi-
shian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
81. 393 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 504.
83. Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights Of, In, and For Children, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB., Summer 1975, at 118, 123.
84. This conclusion is consistent with the cases on which Tinker relied for the proposition
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Once it is understood that Tinker was about family rights, not
strictly children's rights, the case becomes much easier to reconcile with
Ginsberg v. New York,"5 which only a year before had upheld a New
York criminal obscenity statute prohibiting the sale to minors under 17
of material which would not have been obscene as to adults. Underly-
ing the Court's conclusion that a minor had no constitutionally pro-
tected right to procure such literature was the explicit recognition that
"a child might not be as well prepared as an adult to make an intelli-
gent choice as to the material he chooses to read"; 6 "'[tlhe factor of
immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose different
rules.' "817 It would certainly be splitting hairs to resolve the two cases
by suggesting that the adolescent has a greater interest in expressing
political views than in learning about sex especially given the typical
teenager's preoccupation with the latter. Rather, New York's law was
permissible primarily because it recognized that "the parents' claim to
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children
is basic in the structure of our society. . . .IT]he prohibition against
that children had rights protected by the first amendment. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962),
held that a nondenominational prayer composed by the state and used in school violated the
establishment clause. Although the plaintiffs, parents of 10 students, claimed that the use of the
prayers violated the "beliefs, religions, or religious practices of both themselves and their chil-
dren," 1d. at 423, the Court found it unnecessary to distinguish between the rights of parents and
the rights of the students.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), struck down the Arkansas "anti-evolution" statute
on establishment clause and free exercise grounds. Although the plaintiff was a teacher at a Little
Rock high school, a parent of children attending the public schools intervened, alleging "his inter-
est in seeing that his two then school-age sons 'be informed of all scientific theories and hypothe-
ses ... ."' Id. at 110 (Black J., concurring). The Court did not consider whether the sons
themselves might have some independent interest. Tinker also relied on West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which struck down as an infringement of free speech a
state law requiring participation in the pledge of allegiance to the flag. The suit was a class action
brought by three parents on behalf of themselves, their children, and others similarly situated.
Again, the Court found it unnecessary to ascribe the right in question to either parents or children.
At some points in its opinion, the Court seemed to refer to the free speech rights of the students,
see Id. at 637 ("[t]hat they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protec-
tion of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes");
at others, to the rights of the parents, see id. at 641 ("[plrobably no deeper division of our people
could proceed from any provocation than from finding necessary to choose what doctrine and
whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing").
85. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
86. Id. at 642 n.10 (citing Gaylin, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 579, 594 (1968)).
87. 390 U.S. at 638 n.6 (quoting Emerson, Towarda General Theory of the FirstAmendment,
72 YALE LJ 877, 939 (1963)). See also 390 U.S. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring opinion) ("I
think that a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a
child. . . is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of
First Amendment guarantees").
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sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the
magazines for their children."8
E. SUMMARY
In the cases considered in this section, the Court was not really forced
to determine the extent to which youth may diminish the constitutional
protection a minor enjoys. Children were found to have an interest in
equal protection at least equal to that of adults, in part because the
impact of discrimination may vary inversely with age. In the procedu-
ral due process cases, the present interest of the minor may have been
different from that of an adult, but two other factors accounted for the
Court's decisions. One was the effect of delinquency adjudication and
school discipline on the child's future life. In order to protect the mi-
nor against consequences which might be delayed until adulthood, pro-
cedural safeguards had to be given him during childhood. The second
factor was the interest the parents-and indeed, the family as a
unit-had in limitation on state action. This interest becomes even
more crucial in the first amendment context. Even hard cases like
Tinker, closely examined, do not repudiate the maxim that children
should be seen but not heard; it makes all the difference in the world
that their parents have allowed-indeed encouraged-them to speak.
A more difficult situation arises when child and parents are in conflict
over a decision that the child is not competent to make for himself.
II. STATE SUPPORT OF PARENTAL CHOICES IN PARENT-
CHILD CONFLICTS
Until 1976, the Supreme Court did not really face the issue of whether
children have independent constitutional rights. In the last 2 years,
however, several cases have presented the issue of the child's rights
when the parents oppose the child's decision, and the state does no
more than align itself with the parents.
88. 390 U.S. at 639 (citation omitted); see Elias, Sex Publications andMoral Corruption: The
Supreme Court Dilemma, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 302, 320-21 (1967); c Henkin, Morals and the
Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391, 413, n.68 (1963) (laws that impose a
morality on children are distinguishable from those that support right of parents to determine
morals of children).
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A. THE RIGHT TO AN ABORTION: PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF
CENTRAL MissouRI v DANFORTH AND BELLOTI V
BAIRD
At issue in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth8 9 was a
Missouri law passed a little over a year after the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Roe v. Wade90 and Doe v. Bolton.91 The statute provided in
part92 that no abortion could be performed on an unmarried woman
under the age of 18 without the consent of a parent or guardian, unless
it was necessary to preserve the life of the mother.
93
The state's defense of its law emphasized the Court's prior deci-
sions holding that a state may at times subject minors to more stringent
limitations than would be permissible with respect to adults, in part
because some decisions are "outside the scope of a minor's ability to act
in his own best interest or in the interest of the public .... ,,94 The
state claimed that its ability to protect the best interests of the minor
was reinforced by the nature of the statute, which did nothing more
than sustain parental decisions affecting the child. Parental discretion
in that regard was itself an interest of constitutional status protected
from state interference. 95
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion, rejecting the state's claims,
hinged on the premise of a "right of privacy [in] the competent minor
mature enough to have become pregnant."96 Given the existence of
89. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
90. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state criminal abortion law that only permits abortion to save
mother's life without regard to stage of her pregnancy and other interests violates right to privacy
under due process clause of fourteenth amendment).
91. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (state criminal law imposing procedures and restrictions on right to
abortion violates fourteenth amendment, although right to abortion not absolute).
92. The Court unanimously upheld provisions of the Act defining viability, requiring the
woman's consent in writing, and imposing various recordkeeping requirements for health facilities
and physicians concerned with abortions. 428 U.S. at 63-67, 79-81, 89, 101. A majority of the
Court held invalid the requirement of spousal consent to an abortion, the prohibition of saline
amniocentesis as a technique for abortion after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, and the definition
of the standard of care to be exercised by people performing or assisting in abortion. Id. at 67-72,
75-79, 81-84, 89, 101.
93. See 428 U.S. at 84, 85 (statute is reproduced as the Appendix to the Opinion of the
Court).
94. Id. at 72. Examples of such limitations include compulsory education, statutes relating
to child labor, and the regulation of the sale of cigarettes, alcohol, and obscene literature.
95. Id. at 72-73. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
96. 428 U.S. at 75. As authority for the extension to minors of that right, established for
adults by Roe and Doe, Justice Blackmun pointed to In re Gault, Breed v. Jones, Goss v. Lopez,
and Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. Id. at 74-75.
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that right, the Court concluded that the law could be upheld only upon
a showing of some "significant state interest" not present in the case of
an adult.97 Two such interests were considered: safeguarding the fam-
ily unit, and preservation of parental authority.9s The Court con-
cluded that neither interest was likely to be advanced by a requirement
of parental consent "where the minor and the non-consenting parent
are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the preg-
nancy already has fractured the family structure." 99
The right of "privacy" on which the Court's opinion relied is an
ambiguous concept. It has been a dozen years since the right was es-
tablished in Griswold v. Connecticut,"° but experience has not yet suc-
ceeded in defining and categorizing its various aspects. It is clear,
however, that "[t]he cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'pri-
vacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests.
One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions.""' The right to have an abortion, the
Court has recognized, is of the latter sort.' 0 2
If the Court meant to say in Danforth that Missouri's statute was
invalid because some unmarried pregnant women, not yet 18, were suf-
ficiently mature and independent to make their own decisions regard-
ing abortion, then recognizing their right to autonomy in the decision
would seem a natural extension of Roe v. Wade.' There are strong
indications, however, that the Court intended to unhinge the right of
privacy from the age or maturity of the pregnant minor altogether.1t 4
97. Id. at 75.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
101. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (footnotes omitted); see G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 616-56 (9th ed. 1975); Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Per.
sonal Libery, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670 (1973).
102. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 599-600 n.26 (1977).
103. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Such a reading of the Court's opinion is suggested by the qualified
recognition of a "right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become preg-
nant." 428 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added). It might also be inferred from Justice Stevens' dissent-
ing statement: "The Court assumes that parental consent is an appropriate requirement if the
minor is not capable of understanding the procedure and of appreciating its consequences and
those of available alternatives." Id. at 104. But Justice Stevens' opinion went on to say that the
Court also seemed to presume any minor to be capable who had "the capacity to conceive a
child." Id. at 105.
104. Justice Stevens understood the Court to assume "that the capacity to conceive a child
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The majority's opinion did explicitly note that not "every minor, re-
gardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination
of her pregnancy. '  The Court's conclusion,1 6 on the other hand,
seems to be that even those too young or immature to give effective
consent have a right of privacy which protects them against state dele-
gation to their parents of "an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over
the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's
pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent."'
10 7
The same day Danforth was decided, the Court cast some light on
who may make decisions for an immature child once the parental veto
has been eliminated. In Bellotti v. Baird,°8 the Court considered an
attack on a Massachusetts statute which, according to the plaintiffs, did
"not permit abortion without parental consent... in the case of a mi-
nor incapable of giving consent, where the parents are irrationally op-
posed to abortion."'0 9  Unlike Missouri's statute, however, the
Massachusetts law provided that if parental consent were refused,
"consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for
good cause shown . . . ,,l"O Although the Act had never been con-
strued by the Massachusetts courts, the three-judge district court held it
invalid because it read the "good cause" requirement as protecting pa-
rental rights "independent of, and hence potentially at variance with,
[the minor'sI personal interests." '' The Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and ordered that the question of the appropriate construction
of the Act be certified to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court." 2
It found that the construction suggested by the Massachusetts Attorney
and the judgment of the physician are the only constitutionally permissible yardsticks for deter-
mining whether a young woman can independently make the abortion decision." Id. at 105.
Justice White's dissent on this point, in which the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist joined,
rested on the conclusion that the Court had effectively stripped the immature minor of the protec-
tion states had traditionally given her and were entitled to give her, against "immature and im-
provident decisions." Id. at 95.
105. Id. at 75.
106. See id. at 74-75.
107. Id. at 74.
108. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
109. Id. at 146.
110. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 125. (West Supp. 1978) (formerly § 12P).
I11. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 855 (D. Mass. 1975).
112. 428 U.S. at 151-52. Abstention is appropriate not merely where construction by the state
judiciary will obviate altogether the need for a federal constitutional decision, but also where a
state decision may avert that necessity in part, or even materially change the nature of the prob-
lem. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73, 78-79 (1976); Colorado River Constr. Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1973); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-02 (1941).
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General and the other appellants would mean that even a minor unable
to give informed consent could get a court order without consulting her
parents, by showing that abortion was in her own "best interests.", I3
The conclusion which emerges from Danforth and Bellotti, then,
is that the right of privacy, which before had only protected the indi-
vidual's interest in autonomous decisionmaking, has been extended to
embrace the incompetent individual's interest in having decisions made
in his own best interests. The best interests of the child, when child
and parents disagree, are to be determined by a court according to its
own standards.' 
14
B. THE RIGHT TO PURCHASE CONTRACEPTIVES: CAREY V
POPULA4TION SERVICES INTERNATIONAL
If Danforth and Bellotti left some uncertainties about the due process
rights possessed by immature minors, the situation was not much clari-
fied by Carey v. Population Services International,"' decided last Term.
Section 6811(8) of the New York Education Law made it a crime for
any person to sell or distribute any contraceptive of any kind to a mi-
nor under the age of 16, and for anyone other than a licensed pharma-
113. The Court stated:
The picture thus painted by the respective appellants is of a statute that prefers parental
consultation and consent, but... permits even a minor incapable of giving informed
consent to obtain an order without parental consultation where there is a showing that
the abortion would be in her best interests. The statute, as thus read, would be funda-
mentally different from a statute that creates a "parental veto."
428 U.S. at 145 (citing Danforth and other cases).
Because Belloti considered the rights of minors under 18 who were capable of giving con-
sent, as well as the rights of those who were not, it might comport with the limited precedential
effect due an abstention order to suggest that a state could leave to parents of immature minors an
absolute "veto" over abortion decisions. Such a reading is obviously strained, however, in view
of Danforth's recognition that even immature minors have a constitutional right of privacy. See
note 114 infra.
114. Justice Stewart, whose concurrence in the Danforth opinion was joined in by Justice
Powell, puft the two cases together in this fashion:
With respect to the [Missouri] law's requirement of parental consent, § 3 (4), 1 think
it clear that its primary constitutional deficiency lies in its imposition of an absolute
limitation on the minor's right to obtain an abortion. The Court's opinion today in
Bellottiv. Bairdpost, at 147-148, suggests that a materially different constitutional issue
would be presented under a provision requiring parental consent or consultation in most
cases but providing for prompt (i) judicial resolution of any disagreement between the
parent and the minor, or (ii) judicial determination that the minor is mature enough to
give an informed consent without parental concurrence or that abortion in any event is
in the minor's best interest. Such a provision would not impose parental approval as an
absolute condition upon the minor's right but would assure in most instances consulta-
tion between the parent and child.
428 U.S. at 90-91 (footnote omitted).
115. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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cist to distribute contraceptives to persons over 16.116 Although it had
not previously done so, the Court announced that the adult's "right of
access to contraceptives" was a fundamental right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution, because it affected the individual's
"'decision whether to bear or beget a child.' "117 Given the burden
New York's law imposed on that right, the Court examined and re-
jected as not sufficiently compelling the state's asserted interests in con-
traceptive quality control, in avoiding the sale of contraceptives by
young people, and in facilitating enforcement of the other provisions of
the statute. "8
With respect to children under 16, Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion 19 announced that "the right to privacy in connection with de-
cisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as to adults." 2 '
Indeed, the opinion went so far as to state that this interest of the minor
under 16 occupied the status of a "fundamental right."'' Moreover, if
Danforth and Bellotti left any lingering doubt as to whether an imma-
ture minor, incapable of making her own abortion decision, possessed a
due process right to have the decision made in her best interests, Carey
seems to have laid it to rest. The right of access to contraceptives rec-
ognized by a majority of the Court is one held by all minors, of
whatever age or maturity, who may have an interest in procuring them.
Since New York was unable to demonstrate that any significant state
interest, such as discouraging sexual activity among the young, was fur-
thered by restrictions on that right, the plurality found the provisions of
section 6811(8) unconstitutional.
116. Id. at 681. The law also forbade advertising and display of contraceptives. An excep-
tion to § 6811(8) was provided in § 6807(b), which permitted a physician to dispense contracep-
tives to patients of any age if he deemed it "proper in connection with his practice." Id. at 681
n.1.
117. Id. at 685 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
In striking down state regulation of the use of contraceptives in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), the Court emphasized the individual interest in keeping secret "the sacred pre-
cincts of marital bedrooms," and stressed that its decision did not affect laws "regulating their
manufacture or sale." 381 U.S. at 485-86. In Eisenstadt, the Court held that the equal protection
clause afforded unmarried individuals the same right to procure contraceptives as it did married
individuals, but declined to say exactly what that right was. 405 U.S. at 453.
118. 431 U.S. at 690-91. The Court also held invalid the restriction on advertising and dis-
play. Id. at 700-02.
119. Justice Brennan's opinion on this point was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and
Blackmun.
120. 431 U.S. at 691-96.
121. Id. at 696 n.22.
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Justice Brennan's opinion is odd in its insistence that the right in
question was the minor's right to make "decisions affecting procrea-
tion,"' 22 for it simultaneously recognized that minors have "a lesser ca-
pability for making important decisions."' 2 3 In fact, he made it clear
that the "decision proceeds on the assumption that the Constitution
does not bar state regulation of the sexual behavior of minors."'' 24 If it
is true that the minor has no right to engage in sexual relations, it is
difficult to see how he or she has a right to make any meaningful deci-
sion "affecting procreation" at all.
It appears, therefore, that the right of privacy about which the
Carey opinion speaks fits comfortably within neither of the forms
which the Court has previously been willing to recognize: the "interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and. . . the interest in inde-
pendence in making certain kinds of important decisions."' 25 Rather,
it is a right to be protected against certain consequences-venereal dis-
ease and unwanted pregnancy--of improvident decisions to engage in
sexual relations. 26 This right is very much like the interest which the
Court attempted to secure in Danforth and Bellotti, with this signifi-
cant difference: the decision whether or not to abort was seen as having
serious consequences no matter how it was made, and since it would
have to be made differently for different individuals, judicial assistance
was necessary in the case of immature minors. The anti-contraceptive
statute in Carey, however, failed because the state did not demonstrate
that any harm would follow from selling contraceptives to minors, al-
though serious consequences might ensue if they were not made avail-
able. New York's argument that sexual activity in itself was harmful
to minors (a proposition the Court did not dispute), and was likely to
increase if contraceptives were made freely available, was found un-
supported by any evidence. 27
Viewed in this light, Carey has two interesting implications. The
first is apparent from the burden of proof the Court imposed on the
122. Id. at 693.
123. Id. at 693 n.15.
124. Id. at 694 n.17.
125. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
126. Justice Stevens objected to § 6811(8) not because it deprived minors of an interest in
"making certain kinds of important decisions," but because it randomly imposed a "government-
mandated harm," pregnancy and venereal disease, on sexually active minors. 431 U.S. at 715-16.
Justice White concurred in the result "primarily because the State has not demonstrated that the
prohibition against distribution of contraceptives to minors measurably contributes to the deter-
rent purposes which the State advances as justification for the restriction." 1d. at 702-03.
127. 431 U.S. at 696 (Brennan, J.), 702-03 (White, J., concurring).
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state to demonstrate that harm would follow from making contracep-
tives unrestrictedly available. Although Justice Brennan's opinion
spoke at times of a mere rationality standard,12 8 it demanded "support-
ing evidence" that "limiting access to contraceptives [would] in fact
substantially discourage early sexual behavior"; 12 9 it is clear that this
closer scrutiny was subscribed to by a majority of the Court.' 30  It is
not difficult to understand the Court's acceptance of the proposition
that the complete unavailability of contraceptives might result in in-
creases of venereal disease and unwanted pregnancy, given the fairly
well documented incidence of sexual activity among teenagers.' 3' But
the ring of Gyges argument advanced by the state, that sexual activity
would increase if its more obvious adverse consequences could be
avoided, is at least not irrational. The possibility was in fact admitted
by several of the commentators cited by the Court, 32 and the empirical
evidence offered on the deterrence question showed only that many
adolescents engage in sexual activity without regard to the availability
of contraceptives. 33 The rejected propaganda argument-that failure
of the state to disapprove of the purchase of contraceptives could in
itself encourage sexual activity13 4-- was one the Court had accepted on
equally slender evidence in the obscenity context.135  The point is that
128. Id. at 696.
129. Id. at 695-96 (Brennan, J.) (emphasis added).
130. See id. at 691-99 (Brennan, J.), 702 (White, J., concurring) ("the State has not
demonstrated that the prohibition against distribution of contraceptives to minors measurably
contributes to the deterrent purposes which the State advances as justification for the restriction")
(emphasis added). The Court's approach seems to reflect an application to the due process clause
of a model used to explain the Burger Court's equal protection cases and typified by a constitu-
tional requirement "that legislative means must substantially further legislative ends." See Gun-
ther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term--Forword" In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 20 (1972).
131. See, eg., Kantner & Zelnik, Sexual Experience of Young Unmarried Women in the
United States, FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES, October 1972, at 9; Pilpel & Wechsler, Birth Control,
Teenagers and the Law:4 New Look, 1971, FAm. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES, July 1971, at 37; Settlage,
Baroff, & Cooper, Sexual Experience of Younger Teenage Girls Seeking Contraceptive Assistance
for the First Time, FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 1973, at 223; Stein, Furnishing Information and
Medical Treatment to Minors for Prevention, Termination and Treatment of Pregnancy, 5
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 131 (1971); Note, A Minor's Bight to Contraceptives, 7 U. CAL. DAVIS L.
REv. 270, 271-73 (1974).
132. See Reiss, Contraceptive Information and Sexual Morality, J. SEX RESEARCH, April
1966, at 51, 52 (cites Kinsey report for proposition that "only" 44% of his females gave "fear of
pregnancy" as their reason for restricting coitus); Note, supra note 21, at 1010 ("[It is likely that
preventing access to contraceptives has some deterrent effect on sexual conduct. .
133. See note 131 supra.
134. See 431 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
135. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Court upheld a New York law that
made it a criminal offense to sell to a minor under 17 "any picture ... which depicts nudity...
and which is harmful to minors," or "any ... magazine ... which contains ... [such pictures]
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the Court did not simply choose to reduce one set of acknowledged
harms (pregnancy and venereal disease) at the cost of increasing an-
other (the mental and emotional problems associated with sexual activ-
ity by children), for it is far from clear that sexual activity does increase
in proportion to the availability of contraceptives. Rather, the Court
read the Constitution as affording minors a special measure of protec-
tion against certain kinds of adverse and enduring consequences,
1 36
though its decision on the minor's behalf might in some cases lead to
equally harmful consequences of another sort.
The second interesting implication of Carey arises from its clear
indication that New York could not delegate the decision on contracep-
tive access to parents any more than it could forbid access altogether.
Justice Brennan stated that "less than total restrictions on access to con-
traceptives that significantly burden the right [of a minor] to decide
whether to bear children must also pass constitutional scrutiny."1 37 Al-
though New York permitted physicians but not parents to make a final
decision on the child's right of access, 138 the distinction was not signifi-
cant for the Court's purposes. 139  If the conflict in Carey is really, as it
...and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors." Id. at 633. The Court noted that "the
growing consensus of commentators is that 'while these studies all agree that a causal link has not
been demonstrated [between obscenity and the impairment of the ethical and moral development
of youngsters], they are equally agreed that a causal link has not been disproved either.'" Id. at
642 (quoting Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 7, 52).
"'[P]sychiatrists. . .made a distinction between the reading of pornography, as unlikely to be per
se harmful, and the permitting of the reading of pornography, which was conceived as potentially
destructive .... To openly permit implies parental approval and even suggests seductive encour-
agement. If this is so of parental approval, it is equally so of societal approval-another potent
influence on the developing ego."' 390 U.S. at 642-43 n.10 (quoting Gaylin, Book Review, 77
YALE L.J. 579, 594 (1968)).
Justice Brennan's attempt to distinguish Ginsberg, echoing similar sentiments in the district
court's opinion, Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), is a bit
confused. According to him, a more imposing burden of persuasion could be required in Carey
because "Ginsberg concerned a statute prohibiting dissemination of obscene material that it held
was not constitutionally protected. In contrast § 6811(8) concerns distribution of material access
to which is essential to exercise of a fundamental right." 431 U.S. at 697 n.22. But the Ginsberg
Court explicitly noted that the magazines involved were not obscene for adults. 390 U.S. at 634.
And the conclusion that the materials in question were obscene as to minors, Ze., that minors did
not have a fundamental free speech right to procure them, was established only after it was con-
cluded that the legislature had not acted irrationally in deciding that exposure to the designated
materials was harmful to minors. Id. at 641-43.
136. 431 U.S. at 696 n.21 (Brennan, J.), 714-16 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 697.
138. Section 6811(8) forbade even parents to distribute contraceptives to their minor children.
431 U.S. at 708 (Powell, J., concurring). A doctor, however, was permitted to dispense such con-
traceptives as he deemed "proper in connection with his practice." See note 116 supra.
139. "Such 'absolute, and possibly arbitrary' discretion over the privacy rights of minors is
precisely what PlannedParenthood condemned." 431 U.S. at 699 n.24. The outcome of the case
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seems, between alternatives for minimizing the combined impact of
two different types of harm to immature minors, it is at least conceiva-
ble, as Justice Powell's concurrence suggests, 140 that a requirement of
parental permission would increase communication between parent
and child, resulting in wiser decisionmaking regarding the child's sex-
ual behavior. It is also possible that such a statute would produce a
pregnancy rate which was no higher than that resulting from the un-
restricted availability of contraceptives. 141  The outcome in Carey
means, though, that the state is prohibited from entrusting decisions on
some matters (such as contraceptive access) to parents because the pa-
rental decision may harm the child, even though in some-perhaps
most-cases, parental advice and even coerced compliance would be
helpful, and its absence harmful, given the immaturity of the child.
142
itself also suggests that New York could not permit access only through parents. The appellees,
plaintiffs in the district court, included: Population Planning Associates, Inc., a corporation prima-
rily engaged in the mail-order retail sale of nonmedical contraceptives; Population Services Inter-
national, a nonprofit corporation disseminating birth control information and services; Rev.
James B. Hagen, director of a venereal disease prevention program which distributed contracep-
tives; three physicians; and a parent who claimed that New York's law inhibited his freedom to
acquire contraceptives and to distribute them to his minor children. The district court decided
only that Population Planning Associates and Hagen had standing, and did not consider the
standing of the other plaintiffs. Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 327-30 (1975).
The Supreme Court held that Population Planning Associates had the requisite standing, since its
operations were restricted by the law prohibiting distribution to minors, and found it unnecessary
to consider the claims of the other appellees. Given the obvious impossibility of determining the
consumer's age by mail, however, the Court, by striking down the relevant provision on Popula-
tion Planning Associates' behalf, indicated that a state may not constitutionally restrict sales to
adults. Cf. 431 U.S. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring) (fact that statute applied to distribution by
parents was not enough to justify injunction against other applications of the statute). But see id.
at 711 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring). Moreover, had the Court wished to indicate that the statute
was unconstitutional with respect to minors only insofar as it restricted parents' freedom to dis-
tribute contraceptives to their children, there was an appellee presenting precisely that issue.
Justice White, although concurring only in the result of this portion of Justice Brennan's
opinion, apparently did not agree with Justice Powell's suggestion that a state might allow only
parents to distribute contraceptives to minor children. See id. at 702-03 (White, J., concurring),
708 (Powell, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 709-10.
141. To begin with, it is questionable whether free access to contraceptives has any significant
effect on the teenage pregnancy rate. See, e.g., 431 U.S. at 715 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part); Note, supra note 21, at 1010-11 n.67. Whatever the effect might be, it is not irrational to
suppose that in their decision to withhold contraceptives, most parents would consider the im-
probability of any deterrent effect and the chances of pregnancy.
142. Even if we suppose that adolescent sexual activity is not deterred by the complete un-
availability of contraceptives, see generally Kantner & Zelnik, supra note 131, at 9; Pilpel &
Wechsler, supra note 131, at 37, the possibility of access through parents would encourage discus-
sion in cases where it might not otherwise take place. The result might often be successful discour-
agement of adolescent sexual behavior, presumably a desirable objective. If words alone were not
enough, parents would be able to withhold contraceptives in cases where their informed judgment
indicated that such actions would have the desired deterrent effect.
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C. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY IN CHILD BEHAVIOR AND CUSTODY
ADJUDICATION
The suggestion in Danforth and Belo/ti that the pregnant minor has a
right to state assistance in assuring that the abortion decision is made in
her best interests has a familiar ring. While it is not generally thought
that judicial determinations of child custody are constitutionally re-
quired to protect the child's rights, 143 the parens patriae power of the
state, especially during the course of the past century, has been thought
to justify intervention in family affairs to make a custodial determina-
tion that is in the best interests of the child. 144 If the state has the far
more drastic power, and perhaps in some cases the duty, to sever the
parent-child relationship altogether, it would seem a fortiori proper for
the state to intervene on a much more limited, episodic basis to protect
the child against parental manipulation or oppression.
Appealing as the analogy is, however, it is severely misleading. In
the first place, custody decisions are often provoked not by the need for
protection of the child, but merely incidentally to the resolution of pri-
vate disputes in which the child has necessarily become involved. In
divorce proceedings, often the court must choose between two possible
homes, equal perhaps in advantages and disadvantages, largely be-
cause the parents themselves cannot come to agreement.145 A similar
question arises in contested guardianship proceedings.146
Perhaps more important is the fact that although the standards for
intervention to provide custody in the child's best interests are vague,
143. The suggestion in Danforth and Bellotti, that the child has a constitutional claim only
because the state had earlier acted to oppose the child's preference, does not distinguish the cus-
tody situation in any meaningful way. The state, as a general matter, employs substantial coer-
cive power to keep the child in a home situation which might, on judicial inspection, prove quite
detrimental to the child's best interests. Minors under a certain age must have parental permission
before they may marry. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 102 (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting in part). State laws provide for the returning of runaways to their parents, deter-
mine custody, and provide zoning regulations against cohabitation by unrelated persons; the state
also provides more subtle support for the family structure through income tax laws, welfare laws,
the law of intestate succession, and so on.
144. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881); Mnookin, Child-Cuslody Adtdication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1975, at 226, 228 &
n.12, 236 & n.45; Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 672, 676-79 (1942);
Comment, Custody of Children. Best Interests of Child vs. Rights ofarents, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 306
(1945); Note, Alternatives to "'arental Right" in Child Disputes Involving Third Paries, 73 YALE
L.J. 151, 152-60 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Alternatives].
145. Mnookin, supra note 144, at 232.
146. Id. at 238.
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even for cases such as abuse and neglect,147 there is at least "a shared
assumption that the court's child-protection function is to enforce
minimum social standards, not to intervene coercively in an attempt to
do what is best or least detrimental." 148  While particular events may
be crucial to the determination made by the court, the decision is
grounded on whether the child's environment is so detrimental that a
complete transplanation is necessary for his proper development. It is
doubtless because of the nature of that "shared assumption" that the
indeterminancy of the "best interests" test has recently evoked wide-
spread dissatisfaction. 149 A number of commentators have charged that
the judicial dislocation of the child's ongoing relations with parents,
foster parents, or other adult protectors has taken place too frequently
without sufficient justification. Not only is there seldom enough infor-
mation about the child's existing relationships, but there are severe pre-
dictive problems surrounding the desirability of alternative placements,
and a great danger of infusion of the personal values of judges, social
workers, and professionals into the decision to remove a child from his
home. 150
By contrast, a particular, episodic decision like that involved in
Danforth and Bellotti is ordinarily an attempt not to enforce "mini-
mum social standards," but rather to make a more finely tuned deter-
mination of which of two sets of adverse consequences will more
detrimentally affect the adolescent. To be sure, when the parental de-
cision not to abort entails a probability of serious danger to the child's
physical health, the question may be said to resemble cases of child
abuse or neglect. On the other hand, when the predominant issue is
the effect that the decision will have on the minor's emotional stability
and development, it is safe to say at least that the decision whether or
not to abort would best be made differently for different individuals.
151
More importantly, the determination of this issue by the parents, even
147. Id. at 240-41 & n.68.
148. Id. at 268 (emphasis in original); see Goldstein, Medical Carefor the Child at Risk- On
State Supervision of ParentalAutonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 649 (1977).
149. The most widely publicized critique of the best interests approach to child custody is J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SoLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
Freud's contributions to that book are prefigured in 41ternatives, supra note 144.
150. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, supra note 149, at 31-64; Mnookin, supra note
144, at 257-61, 268-72.
151. This, at least, seems to be recognized by all the opinions in Danforth. See 428 U.S. at
67 (Blackmun, J.), 91 (Stewart, J., concurring), 94-95 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), 102-05 (Stevens, J., same). The individualized measure is also implicit in Bellottis sug-
gestion that a hearing be held to determine whether or not an abortion would be in the best
interests of the minor too immature to consent.
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when their conclusion differs from that of the pregnant child, takes
place within a family structure which will be, if nothing else, at least
intact enough to make an involuntary termination of parental custody
unjustified. From this point of view, the critical premise underlying
Danforth's conclusion is the largely gratuitous assumption that "the
minor and the nonconsenting parent are.. . fundamentally in conflict
and the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the fam-
ily structure."'
' 52
Danforth, Bellotti, and Carey took certain decisions on behalf of
the unemancipated child out of the hands of the parents and put them
into the hands of the court. But if the Court's premise regarding the
cohesiveness of the family structure is unfounded, there would seem to
be a number of compelling reasons for permitting those decisions to
remain with the parents. First, there is the difficulty a court would
encounter in evaluating the bases for the parents' and child's repective
positions. Parental objection to abortion, for example, might rest on
religious principle, a desire to punish, legitimate concern for the child's
emotional health, or a combination of these factors; a parental choice
for abortion over the child's objection might arise from fear of social
embarrassment, a concern over lack of resources, or again, a conclusion
that the child would be better off emotionally. The pregnant minor's
motives might include any of these, or might be as evanescent as anxi-
ety about being pregnant during the swimming season, a desire to sub-
stitute a real baby for recently abandoned dolls, or a wish to spite her
parents for entirely unrelated reasons. Though nominally opposed to
her parents' position, she might unconsciously share their convictions
to some unacknowledged extent.
Of course the ascertainment of mental states is not a task to which
the judicial system is entirely unaccustomed. To take the most obvious
example, a determination of intent is a necessary component of most
criminal and many tort decisions. But intent is a relatively well-defined
and narrow concept-whether a party had a particular result as his
conscious objective-and one that might fairly be taken for granted in
the abortion dispute. The minor intends either to have an abortion or to
have the child; her parents may intend the contrary. It is motive which
is relevant to the "best interests" decision. Moreover, the reasons why
the minor and those who know her best would opt for or against abor-
tion or contraception are likely to be as pertinent as any other informa-
tion about what course of conduct is most desirable for the
152. Id. at 75.
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adolescent. 153 Again, of course, it is true that in criminal and other
cases motive provides at least evidentiary matter relevant to the estab-
lishment of intent, e.g., revenge as motive for intentional murder. But
to make a substantive, rather than evidentiary, decision about motive
introduces an element of psychoanalysis that would take the matter be-
yond the capabilities of most judges.
The difficulty of judicial resolution is compounded by severe pre-
dictive problems. Even if it were possible to determine with some pre-
cision the psychological dynamics of the minor's present personal and
family situation, it would be rash to suppose that a court could, with
any degree of confidence, foresee the long-term effects of its decision
on the minor. For example, would the child, after an abortion was
ordered over a religious objection by the parents, come to regret the
decision after several more years of assimilating the parents' views?
Would the effect of parental rejection after such a decision be more
severe than the consequences of childbearing would have been? On
the other hand, if abortion is denied over parental objection, would the
minor soon be unwilling or unable to care for the infant? What effect
would the sudden projection into adulthood have on her? As with the
predictive problems inherent in custody determinations, we have in this
situation "[n]o theory at all. . . widely capable of generating reliable
predictions about the psychological and behavioral consequences of al-
ternative dispositions for a particular child."' 54
Underlying these factual problems is the still more profound diffi-
culty implicit in the very notion of "best" interests-choosing for the
minor a system of values according to which her choices may be
ranked. The outcome of either the abortion or contraception decision
may depend on the value placed on emotional health, preservation of
nascent life, maximization of possibilities for future lifestyles, mainte-
nance of an accustomed standard and style of living, or even preserva-
tion of physical health. A rational adult making an identical decision
on her own behalf might base her choice on any one of these values,
and consider the others undesirable, or even morally repugnant. It goes
without saying that a consideration of the "best" interests of a minor
153. In Bellotti the Court, as grounds for abstention, relied heavily on the Massachusetts
Attorney General's interpretation of the Massachusetts statute. According to him, "'[I]n opera-
tion, the parents' actual deliberation must range no further than would that of a pregnant adult
making her own abortion decision.'. . . And the superior court's review will ensure that parental
objection based upon other considerations will not operate to bar the minor's abortion." 428 U.S.
at 144.
154. Mnookin, supra note 144, at 258.
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plaintiff would surely be influenced by a judge's own predilections; if
not, the judge in many cases would have no less arbitrary alternative
than to roll dice to choose a justification for acting one way or another.
Judicial intervention for particularized decisionmaking on the mi-
nor's behalf thus shares to a great extent the difficulties inherent in the
use of the best interests standard in custody cases. While the custody
decision may require more information, raise more severe predictive
problems, and perhaps impose more difficult value-choices than many
types of particularized decisionmaking because the question concerns
an entire change of the child's environment, Danforth, Bello/i, and
Carey also concern decisions which will radically affect future life-
choices. Unlike the custody determination, localized intervention
would take place when the parents are still sufficiently interested in the
minor to make a total severance of the family relationship unjustified.
Not only will the parents have a far more profound understanding of
the child's psychological makeup and of the long-term consequences of
the decision than will a court, but also their conclusion will ordinarily
rest on love for the child and the family's mutual self-interest.
1 55
Additionally, intervention by the court to make a particular deci-
sion on the minor's behalf does not impose any continuing obligation
on the state, unlike the need in many custody cases to provide extended
foster or institutional care.1 56 The temptation to intervene, therefore,
is unlikely to be lessened by offsetting costs. Moreover, intervention in
custodial cases is justified by the parens patriae power of the state, a
power which the child cannot require the state to exercise; in contrast,
the basis for intervention recognized by Danforth and Bello/i is the
minor's personal due process right. This distinction might result in a
more active judicial role in abortion and contraceptive decisionmaking.
In substituting judicial for parental determination of the child's
best interests, Danforth, Bellti, and Carey also have significant impli-
cations for a number of other contexts. None of the three cases would
go so far as to inhibit a state from leaving to parents the decision
whether minors may consume alcoholic beverages before attaining the
state's applicable age of majority. There the consequences of denying
the child's preference are far less severe than pregnancy, venereal dis-
ease, abortion, or an unwanted child. The lesson is far more easily
155. Goldstein, supra note 148, at 649-50.
156. Cf. Mndookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599, 610-13
(1973) (legal responsibility for children in foster care remains with state; although foster care
should be temporary, state seldom attempts to return children to natural parents).
CHILD, PARENT AND STATE
transferred to decisions about the proper medical treatment for a sick
or injured child, a decision traditionally left with parents or guardian.
To be sure, a parental decision not to treat, or to treat in a particular
way, affects no "privacy" interest the child may have in procreation (as
the laws struck down in Danforth and Carey were said to), but it is silly
to suppose this is what teenage sex is about anyway. The real due
process question in Carey, Danforth, and Belloti, if not the child's in-
terest in autonomous decisionmaking, is rather the restriction of life-
choices through the imposition of serious and lasting consequences by
state and parents. If this is so, it becomes difficult to distinguish the
decision whether to operate on a spine curvature from the decision
whether to refuse an abortion or deny contraceptives. In such a situa-
tion, the cases seem to indicate that the child has a constitutional right,
something like due process privacy, to an independent judicial determi-
nation of her best interests uncontaminated by the religious, ethical, or
psychological predilections of the parents.
Nor does there seem to be any a prior reason why the principle of
"serious and lasting consequences" should be restricted to physical
harm. Suppose, for example, that the state of Wisconsin permitted
Amish parents to withdraw their children from public school after the
fifth grade. 57 Surely the deprivation of 5 years of secular education
would prove a serious obstacle at least to those children who eventually
leave the Amish community' 58 If so, it seems the child could force a
hearing on the issue of his due process entitlements.
Abortion and contraception are, of course, unique in that there is a
natural lower limit to the age group interested in claiming rights to
them. Thus, it might be contended that recognition of a constitutional
right against state delegation of judgment to parents in those cases
might not carry over mutatis mutandis to cases involving the minor's
rights in school, religious activity, work, freedom of expression, and
other forms of medical care, where the harm from nonrecognition of
rights does not so clearly coincide with the occurrence of a definable
aspect of physical maturity. The harm that Danforth sought to avoid,
however, was not simply parturition; rather, it was the possibility that
the decision whether or not to abort would be made wrongly in light of
the effect it would have on the minor's mental and emotional health,
family and social circumstances, and life plans and possibilities.
157. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (statute denying such withdrawal held un-
constitutional).
158. But see id. at 224 (missing 2 years would not be serious).
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Faced with New York's claim in Carey that the state had simply made
a choice between two types of harm, the Court decided to afford mi-
nors constitutional protection against-and to employ a more exacting
standard of review in cases involving-the harm which the court con-
sidered more enduring and "devastating."' 59 But it is not difficult to
imagine cases where decisions about the minor's education, employ-
ment, religious upbringing, medical treatment, or freedom to speak,
act, or associate, if wrongly made, would have similarly profound con-
sequences whether made at age 6 or 16.
It might also be argued that the Constitution provides special pro-
tection to decisionmaking autonomy in the abortion and contraceptive
contexts because these choices involve consequences that are qualita-
tively different from other situations. Whether the effects are the de-
nial of the opportunity to give birth to' 60 and raise the child, 16 or the
distresses associated with an unwanted child, 62 prior cases have vigor-
ously supported adults' interests in making their own choices free from
state coercion. Where a reproduction decision will certainly not be in-
telligently made, however, the Constitution has provided the individual
little substantive protection; 63 witness the laws regulating the age for
marriage' 64 and defining statutory rape.165 It is thus not at all clear
that the Constitution protects reproduction decisions any more vigor-
ously than it does free speech or the free exercise of religion. To be
sure, the consequences of the decision whether or not to bear a child
are grave, and it is of the utmost importance that the choice be made in
the minor's best interest. But if Danforth and Belloti indicate that the
decision must ultimately be made by a court should the parents and
child disagree, then the same should be true when the minor wants to
attend public school rather than the parochial school chosen by her
parents or opposes surgery which her parents feel would be benefi-
cial.1
66
159. See 431 U.S. at 696 & n.21.
160. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
161. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923).
162. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
163. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
164. See, eg., N.Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW §§ 15, 15-a (McKinney 1977).
165. See, eg., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(a) (McKinney 1975).
166. Goldstein, supra note 148, at 664-68.
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If Danforth, Bellotti, and Carey stand for the child's right to judi-
cial assistance in avoiding serious and lasting consequences imposed at
least in part by the state, it is perhaps fair to conclude by asking
whether they in fact represent any extension of the principles underly-
ing the procedural due process cases involving delinquency adjudica-
tion '16 7 and school suspension. 168  In both these situations the
justification for the imposition of adult-style procedures rested in part
on the fact that such judgments involve severe, detrimental, and lasting
consequences for the minor.'6 9 Surely the decision whether or not to
have an abortion will affect the minor more permanently and pro-
foundly than would any suspension from school. The difference, if
there is one, cannot simply be that in the procedural due process cases
the parents were aligned with the child against the state. Although
that fact played an important role in In re Gault,171 such a suggestion
would lead to the unsupportable conclusion that an adolescent could be
unfairly incarcerated or suspended merely because his parents did not
join his opposition to the state's misguided decision.
There are, however, at least two important distinctions between
the two types of cases, one related to the nature of the decision which
affects the minor, the other concerning the justification for state inter-
vention in the decisionmaking process. When the state seeks to impose
sanctions for misbehavior in delinquency proceedings or in a school
disciplinary proceeding, the decision ultimately turns on whether the
minor has engaged in certain proscribed conduct. When, by contrast,
the state attempts to make a decision which the child is too immature
or uninformed to make for himself, the minor's conduct is quite beside
the point. Whether she has engaged in sexual intercourse, for exam-
ple, is irrelevant to whether an abortion should be ordered. The differ-
ence is between so-called "act-oriented" and "person-oriented"
decisions. 7 1 The latter require for their adjudication the kinds of in-
formation that parents alone are most likely to possess. Thus, al-
though the Constitution might well be read to protect the immature
minor against certain kinds of harm caused by the state, it is wrong to
characterize as "harm" the delegation of judgment-which by hypothe-
sis cannot rest with the minor-to the presumptively most capable deci-
167. See text accompanying notes 27-51 supra.
168. See text accompanying notes 52-76 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 48-51, 58-60 supra.
170. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
171. See Fuller, Two Principles ofHumanAssociation, in VoLuNTARY AssocIATIONs 3, 17-19
(J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969); Mnookin, supra note 144, at 250-51 & n.130.
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sionmaker: the parents. This is true even though the parents' decision
proves ultimately to be misguided, for the simple reason that there is no
assurance that a court can decide better, or even less arbitrarily.
72
The second distinction is related to the first, or perhaps it is simply
another way of characterizing it. In delinquency adjudication and
school discipline situations the state must act in the interest of the pub-
lic, rather than simply in the interest of the child. 173 Not only must the
state take some action to contain interruptions of the school system by
juveniles, but the dispositional decision in such cases is not one that can
conveniently be left to parents because of the presumed bias generated
by family ties and parental concern with their own children's best inter-
ests. The same rationale does not apply to the judicial decisionmaking
of Danforth, Bellotli, and Carey. There is no similar public interest
which requires a decision by the government. It cannot, therefore, be
said that the same factors which required judicial protection from harm
in the procedural due process cases also require judicial decisions in
abortion and contraceptive cases.
III. THE DEVELOPING NOTION OF FAMILY PRIVACY
The child's interest in privacy which Danforth and Carey found pro-
tected by due process liberty was an interest in having certain decisions
made consistent with the child's best interests. But there is another
facet of what is broadly considered under the heading of "privacy." It
concerns not so much the strictly individual interest in autonomous
decisionmaking as it does the right to participate with others in an inti-
mate relationship, that is, the "private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter." 174 Although historically family privacy has been
addressed as an issue of spousal and parental rights, the Court for the
first time last Term intimated that children as well may have a constitu-
tional interest in the family relationship which is protected by the due
process clause. This recognition of the child's right to participate in
that relationship may, at least in some cases, be fundamentally at odds
172. See text accompanying notes 153-54 supra.
173. This analysis does not apply to status offenses which may be the predicate for delin-
quency adjudication. See, e.g., Note, Parens Patriae and Statutory Vagueness in the Juyenlle
Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745 (1973). But attempts to deal with such questions by legislative definition
and judicial enforcement have proved singularly unproductive. See generally ABA INSTITUTE OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR (rent.
Draft, 1977); Note, supra.
174. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
US. 158, 166 (1944).
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with the right of the state to intervene in the family relationship on
behalf of the child which emerges from Danforth and Carey.
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PARENTS' INTEREST
The Court has frequently spoken of constitutional protection for differ-
ent elements of the family relationship. Prior to last Term, however,
the decisions indicated that the locus of protectible interests was in the
parents alone. As a result, some commentators failed to recognize that
claims for state protection of the child's right to autonomous develop-
ment conflict not only with parental claims for psychological gratifica-
tion, but also with the child's constitutional right to be directed, until
some difficult-to-define point of maturation, according to familial pat-
terns of growth.
175
One line of cases which has found due process protection for the
family, while focusing on parental rights, has concerned state attempts
to direct the growth of children within the context of the compulsory
educational system. The earliest of these cases is Meyer v.
Nebraska,176 which overturned a state law prohibiting the teaching of
modem languages in elementary school. Although the Court stated
that the issue was "whether the statute as construed and applied unrea-
sonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the teacher by the Four-
teenth Amendment," the conclusion that it did was heavily influenced
by the rights of the parents themselves.'7 7  The Court expressed some
sympathy with "[tihe desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous
people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current
discussions of civic matters,"'178 but a ban on instruction in foreign lan-
guages seemed a rather roundabout way to that distant goal.
17 9
175. See, e.g., R. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974); Burt, supra note 83, at 118; Note, State In-
trusion into Family Affairs: Justications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383 (1974). But see
H. FOSTER, A "BILL OF RIGHTS" FOR CHILDREN 11-30 (1974) (recognizes right to discipline and
guidance).
176. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
177. The Court stated:
IT]he liberty [guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment] denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. . . . [Meyer's] right thus to teach and the right
of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of
the Amendment.
Id. at 399-400.
178. Id. at 402.
179. "No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some language other
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Pierce v. Society of Sisters8 ° was more explicit regarding the par-
ents' rights. At issue was an Oregon law which made it a misdemeanor
for parents to send children between the ages of 8 and 16 to private
schools. Injunctive relief was sought by a society of Catholic sisters and
by Hill Military Academy, both of which operated private schools, but
the Court found that their standing to sue depended on their ability to
assert the rights of their patrons. 18' The Court held the law unconsti-
tutional because the parents enjoyed a due process right to bring up
children as they saw fit, free from unreasonable state interference.1
8 2
Although the Court in both Meyer and Pierce relied on the due
process clause, and although subsequent cases have repeatedly tied pa-
rental rights to that provision,183 it is clear that the values of which the
Court was so solicitous were ones which today would fit more comfort-
ably under the first amendment:8 4 the right of access to ideas pro-
tected by the free speech clause, and the free exercise of religion. The
surprising thing about Meyer and Pierce is the fact that the parents
seem to have been permitted to assert claims of free access and free
exercise on the child's behalf although no independent interest of their
own was at stake. 85 Perhaps more accurately, the parents were permit-
ted to assert an interest which might be characterized, consistently with
Meyer and Pierce, in one of at least two ways. The first, building on
the familiar phenomenon of living one's life through one's children,
might be called the parent's right to exercise his religion through the
child, and to extend through the child ideas, language, and customs
which the parent believes to be important. The second, recognizing at
than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent infringement of
rights long freely enjoyed." Id. at 403.
180. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
181. Id. at 535-36.
182. The Court stated:
[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control ... .The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Unioi repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, cou-
pled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Id. at 434-35.
183. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 176-77 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
184. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (characterizing Pierce and
Meyer as first amendment cases).
185. See Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jrus Tertia, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 423, 429-30
(1974) ("The Court appears never to have heard a case in which a litigant's only assertion of harm
was that the challenged action deprived third parties of their constitutional rights"),
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least some element of disinterested love of parent for child, might be
called the parent's right to pass on to the child ideas and beliefs which
the parent has found important and rewarding, and believes will con-
tribute to the child's future happiness and goodness.
The Court also found due process protection for the family while
focusing exclusively on the rights of parents in a series of cases dealing
with the right to custody in a broad sense. Typical is Stanley v.
Illinois,I86 in which the Court held invalid an Illinois law under which
the children of unwed fathers become wards of the state upon the death
of the mother. Concluding that Stanley had a due process right to a
hearing before being deprived of custody, the Court began with the
assumption that the right at stake was ."the interest of a parent in the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children
"187
The remaining cases protecting family rights decided under the
due process clause have all concerned one aspect or another of concep-
tion and childbearing, whether it be contraception,188 abortion, 189 or
interference with pregnancy by the state.19 It is, however, obvious
that these elements of family life are ones in which the child, yet un-
born, has only the most metaphysical interest.
Cases outside the due process sphere which have protected what
might broadly be called familial interests have similarly focused exclu-
sively on the rights of the parents. The Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"'
in striking down Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance laws as ap-
plied to Amish parents, justified its exacting scrutiny of the state's as-
serted interests in compulsory education by reference to the free
186. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
187. Id. at 651. In May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), the Court held that Ohio was not
bound to give full faith and credit to a Wisconsin decree awarding custody of a child to the father
after granting an ex parte divorce. The Court stated that "[rights far more precious to [the wife]
than property rights will be cut off if she is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of custody"
granted without personal jurisdiction. Id. at 533. Most recently in Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S. Ct.
549 (1978), the Court held that Stanley did not require a natural father's authority to veto adop-
tion by the mother's husband to be measured by the same standard that was applied to a divorced
father. The effect of this holding, however, was simply to give "full recognition to a family unit
already in existence," id. at 555, in a case where the natural father had borne no responsibility for
the child's care.
188. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); id. at 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
189. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
190. Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
191. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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exercise claims of the parents, not of the children. 92 The Court's opin-
ion in Prince v. Massachusetts,'93 which has been used as authority for
the proposition that "there does exist a 'private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter,' ",194 began by noting that the only real
obstacle to upholding Massachusetts' child labor laws was whether the
laws "contravene[d] the Fourteenth Amendment by denying or abridg-
ing appellant's [Sarah Prince, the aunt and custodian of a 9-year-old
girl] freedom of religion and by denying to her the equal protection of
the laws." '95  Finally, the equal protection cases on which the Court
has relied 196 as support for the existence of the right of privacy have
dealt with the right to marry197 and the problem of compulsory sterili-
zation;198 again these are aspects of familial relationships in which the
child has an inchoate interest at best.
B. THE RELATIONAL INTEREST
1. Smith v. OFFER
In Smith v. OFFER,19 9 the Court considered the constitutionality of
New York's procedures for removing children from a foster home
where they had resided for a year or more. The statutory and adminis-
trative scheme, which applied statewide, provided that an agency hav-
ing custody of a foster child could remove the child from a foster
home2 '° after providing the foster parents with 10 days' advance notice
and an opportunity for a "conference" with the social services depart-
ment, at which the foster parents might appear with counsel to object,
and would be advised of the reasons for removal.20' If the child was
removed after the conference, the foster parents could appeal to the
department of social services for a full adversary administrative hear-
192. Id. at 230-31.
193. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
194. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at
166).
195. 321 U.S. at 160.
196. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 499; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651.
197. Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
198. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
199. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
200. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 383(2) (McKinney 1976).
201. 18 N.Y. CODES, RULES, & REos. § 450.10(a)-(d) (1977). The Court assumed that those
procedures, as well as the rights of appeal, see note 202 infra, applied to all removals from foster
homes, whether transfer was being made to another foster home, or to the natural parents. 431
U.S. at 830 n.28.
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ing with a right of judicial review.2"2 In addition, if the child had been
in foster care for 18 months or more, the foster parent could obtain a
judicial review of the child's status before any agency decision was
made.20 3  Within New York City this scheme was supplemented by
regulations providing that in any case in which a foster child was being
transferred to another foster home rather than to his natural parents,
the foster parents could, before the child was removed, request a full
hearing similar to a trial.2' These procedures were challenged by OF-
FER and a group of individual foster parents, who brought a class ac-
tion suit against New York State and City officials on behalf of




The three-judge district court held the procedures invalid, con-
cluding that any transfer of a foster child, whether to another foster
home or to the natural parents, must be preceded by a hearing at which
all concerned parties could appear and present any relevant informa-
tion.20 6 The Supreme Court reversed.
The fundamental premise on which the foster parents based their
argument for greater procedural protection was that, at least after a
child has lived in a foster home for more than a year, the bond linking
foster parents and foster child is strong enough to create a "psychologi-
cal family" entitled to protection under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 7 Justice Brennan's majority opinion stated
that it was unnecessary to decide the validity of that premise.208 At the
same time, the Court seemed willing to accept the proposition that fos-
ter families have some liberty interest protected by the due process
202. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1963) (general right of review); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 400 (McKinney 1976).
203. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 392 (McKinney Supp. 1977); see 431 U.S. at 831-32.
204. 431 U.S. at 831 (citing New York City Human Resources Administration, Department of
Social Services--Special Services for Children, Procedure No. 5 (April 5, 1974)).
205. The district court appointed independent counsel for the foster children, and permitted a
group of natural mothers of children in foster care to intervene. OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F.
Supp. 277, 278 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
206. 418 F. Supp. at 282.
207. 431 U.S. at 839; see, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FLEoD, & A. SOLNIT, supra note 149, at 19
("Whether any adult becomes the psychological parent of a child is based... on day-to-day
interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. The role can be fulfilled either by a biologi-
cal parent or by an adoptive parent, or by any other caring adult-but never by an absent, inactive
adult, whatever his biological or legal relationship to the child may be"); cf. Alternatives, supra
note 144 (suggesting that child custody disputes be decided mainly on the basis of preserving the
most important "affection-relationship" that the child has developed).
208. 431 U.S. at 847.
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clause. Although the word "family" usually implies the existence of a
blood relationship, the Court found that "the emotional attachments
that derive from the intimacy of daily association" also deserved pro-
tection. 0 9 Moreover, the right asserted was not merely parental, but
relational-a right to "'familial privacy' . . . in the integrity of [the
foster] family unit."' 10 Thus, the claim was one which foster parents
might assert on the children's behalf as well as their own, even though
the court-appointed counsel for the children and the intervening natu-
ral parents objected.2z '
The Court found, however, at least two important distinctions be-
tween the foster family and the natural family. First, the foster family,
because it is the creature of state law and contractual arrangements,
21 2
has expectations and entitlements which are much more limited than
those of the natural family, even in the case where deep emotional at-
tachments develop. Perhaps more importantly, while the privacy inter-
est of the natural family usually exists in isolation, any rights which the
foster family has will almost necessarily conflict with the claims of the
natural parents, who in the ordinary case will have given the child up
with the understanding that it might be returned on demand.213 Be-
cause of these distinctions, the Court held that the city and state re-
moval procedures were consistent with the standards required by
procedural due process.
214
209. Id. at 844.
210. Id. at 842.
211. Id. at 841-42 & nn. 44 & 45.
212. Id. at 845-46. In New York, foster parents are licensed by the state or certified by an
authorized foster care agency. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 375-377 (McKinney 1976). They provide
care under a contract with the agency, and are compensated for their services. See 18 N.Y.
CODES, RULES, & REGS. §§ 606.2, 606.6 (1977). Contracts typically reserve the agency's right to
remove the child on request. OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd
sub nom. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(2) (McKinney
1976). Where placement is voluntary the natural parent has a right to have the child returned,
absent a court order, within 20 days of notice to the agency. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-a(2)(a)
(MeKinney Supp. 1977).
Although the foster parent has care of the child's day-to-day supervision, the natural parent
retains legal guardianship, and the authority to consent, for example, to surgery, the child's mar-
riage, or enlistment in the armed forces. 431 U.S. at 827-28 & n.20. The natural parent also has
the obligation to visit the child and plan for his future.
Where the child is placed in foster care by court order, rather than voluntarily, the conse-
quences are not much different, except that the parent is not entitled to have the child returned on
demand. Id. at 828.
213. 431 U.S. at 846.
214. Id. at 847-56. The test employed by the Court was that announced in Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which requires consideration of the nature of the private interest
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The district court had faulted the city's procedure for insufficiently
protecting the child's rights in several respects: it was available only on
request of the foster parents; neither child nor natural parent was a
party to the hearing; and, no hearing at all was provided in the case of
return to the natural parents. 15 But since the right affected, however,
was "a right of family privacy," a relational interest, the Court pre-
sumed that the child would have nothing to lose by separation from a
foster parent who did not care enough about him to contest the re-
moval; such a family would have little emotional cohesion.21 6 Nor was
it fatal that child and natural parent were not represented at city hear-
ings; natural parents' rights were not at stake in removals from one
foster home to another, and they would know little about foster home
conditions which the foster care agency did not.217  Because the sole
criterion for an agency's decision to remove was the child's best inter-
ests, any function performed by an independent representative for the
child would be essentially duplicative. 2 8 Finally, where removal was
made to the home of the natural parents, the relative strengths of the
rights involved permitted the agency to dispense with any prior hear-
ing.2 1
9
The Court also sustained the state procedures which provided not
only a preremoval conference and postremoval hearing, but also a
prior judicial hearing before any removal of a child who had been in
foster care for 18 months or more. Although the latter procedure was
not available to all class members, the Court saw little reason to pre-
sume that the emotional attachments being protected ripened in 1 year
rather than 18 months.22 0
Justice Stewart, although concurring in the judgment,221 took issue
with the Court's "assumption that either foster parents or foster chil-
dren in New York have some sort of 'liberty' interest in the continua-
tion of their relationship."22 2  Since the foster family was wholly a
involved, the risks of erroneous deprivation from the procedures employed, and the relative cost
and value of the alternative safeguards available. Id.
215. 418 F. Supp. at 285. The district court also found that the city removal procedure im-
properly overlapped with the state "conference" and postremoval hearings, id., a finding that the
Court disposed of summarily. 431 U.S. at 853.
216. 431 U.S. at 850 (emphasis in original).
217. Id. at 851.
218. Id. at 852 n.59.
219. Id. at 853.
220. Id. at 853-54.
221. Id. at 856 (Stewart, J., concurring) (joined by Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist, J.).
222. Id. at 857.
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creation of state law, which conferred "no right on foster families to
remain intact, defeasible only upon proof of specific acts or circum-
stances, ' 223 there was not even a state-created liberty or property inter-
est to which an expectation of continuity could attach. Although close
emotional attachments might develop, such a development, far from
being a protectible interest, would represent a breakdown of the state
system, since it might hinder adjustment to a permanent home.224
2. Moore v. City of East Cleveland
In Moore v. City ofEast Cleveland,225 the Court reversed the conviction
of a homeowner who had violated a city housing ordinance requiring
single family dwellings and limiting the definition of "family" to in-
clude only a few categories of related individuals. Moore lived in her
East Cleveland home with her son Dale and her grandsons, Dale, Jr.,
and John Moore, who were cousins. According to the ordinance, a fam-
ily could include "not more than one dependent... child of the nomi-
nal head of the household.., and the... dependent children of such
dependent child. 226 In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,227 the Court
had sustained a similar ordinance limiting the types of groups which
could occupy a single dwelling unit, finding that such a limitation bore
a rational relationship to a permissible state objective.
Justice Powell's plurality opinion, noting that the ordinance in
Boraas had permitted cohabitation by all who were related by "blood,
adoption, or marriage," held that a different standard of review was
required: "[When the government intrudes on choices concerning fam-
ily living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the impor-
tance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which
they are served by the challenged regulation. ' 228 Moore's decision to
live with her son and grandsons, unlike Boraas which involved the de-
cision of a group of students, was entitled to more vigorous substantive
due process protection rights "precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most
cherished values, moral and cultural. '229 This tradition encompasses
223. Id. at 859.
224. Id. at 857-62; see In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 18
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959).
225. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
226. Id. at 496 & n.2.
227. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
228. 431 U.S. at 499 (Powell, J.) (joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
229. Id. at 503-04 (footnotes omitted).
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extended as well as nuclear families. Measured by the more stringent
standard, the ordinance was found to serve only marginally the city's
admittedly legitimate goals of preventing overcrowding, minimizing
traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding undue financial burdens
on the public schools.230 Justice Stevens, who concurred in the judg-
ment, would simply have held that the East Cleveland ordinance de-
prived Moore of the right to use her property as she saw fit, and could
not be justified "under the limited standard of review [appropriate for]
zoning decisions."23 1
In dissent, Justice White agreed that Moore's claim to family pri-
vacy represented "a liberty interest within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause." 232 Whatever historical or traditional antecedents her
claim may have had, however, it was not entitled to the protection of
substantive due process because the right to live with a particular set of
grandchildren was not" 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "233
It was sufficient that the ordinance protected "the head of the house-
hold... and spouse, their parents, and any number of their unmarried
children. ' 234 Dissenting separately, Justice Stewart also found the case
inapposite for substantive due process review because the challenged
regulation "did not dictate to [Moore] how her own children were to be
nurtured and reared . . .[and] does not prevent parents from living
together or living with their unemancipated offspring."
235
3. The Impications of OFFER and Moore
With respect to the proposition advanced here-that the child's right to
parental direction is the correlate of, and equal in strength to, the par-
ent's right to guide the child-it must be admitted that OFFER and
Moore give only indirect support. Neither case dealt with the garden
variety family relationship: Moore concerned the mutual rights of
grandmother and grandson; OFFER concerned the rights of foster par-
ents and foster child. Nevertheless, both cases recognize for the first
time that family rights are relational-that there can be no right in the
parent which does not have its correlative in the child.
230. Id. at 499-500.
231. Id. at 520; see Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
232. Id. at 547.
233. Id. at 549; see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
234. 431 U.S. at 550.
235. Id. at 536 (Stewart, J.) (joined by Rehnquist, J.). Chief Justice Burger would have af-
firmed because Moore had failed to avail herself of the administrative remedy provided in the
city's variance procedure. Id. at 521.
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The nature of those rights was most clearly explicated in OFFER,
where a majority of the Court was willing to assume, although it explic-
itly did not decide, that the foster family was entitled to the protection
of the due process clause because the intimacy of its interaction consti-
tuted a "liberty" interest.236 Although prior cases had spoken only of
the parental interest in childrearing and "promoting a way of life,"
237
OFFER clearly attributes an interest to all family members involved.
The contest was not simply a triad of foster parents, natural parents,
and state; the children themselves were plaintiffs. Indeed, although
the district court had appointed independent counsel to represent the
children,238 the Court found that the foster parents could also assert the
children's "right to familial privacy," since "this interest . . . to
whatever extent it exists, belongs to the foster parents as much as to the
foster children."23 9
The Court ultimately rejected the procedural safeguards granted
by the district court, but the grounds for its rejection were at times re-
vealing. In overturning the judgment that the "independent review"
administrative proceeding should be provided as a matter of course,
rather than only upon request of the foster parents, the Court noted
that if the foster parents did not care enough about the child to request
a hearing, then the emotional relationship sought to be protected would
not be present in any event.240
Undoubtedly the most significant aspect of OFFER is that the
majority was tentatively willing to attribute to the foster family the
right of family privacy which, in prior cases, had been attributed only
to natural parents. The significant distinctions which Justice Bren-
nan's opinion noted between foster and natural families were simply
that the former is a creature of state law, with consequently diminished
236. 431 U.S. at 844.
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the soci-
ety, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily associa-
tion, and from the role it plays in "promot[ing] a way of life" through the instruction of
children, Wrsconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 231-233 (1972), as well as from the fact of
blood relationship.
Id.
237. Id. at 818-21 & n.4.
238. See OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) rev'dsub nom. Smith
v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
239. 431 U.S. at 842 & nA5. Helen Buttenwieser, independent counsel for the children,
maintained throughout the litigation that the foster parents had no constitutional interest in-
dependent of the children's, and that the children's best interests would not be served by the
adversary hearing process. See 418 F. Supp. at 278.
240. 431 U.S. at 850-51 & n.57.
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expectations, and that its rights must yield to those of the latter.2 41
Neither distinction suggests that familial rights which are relational in
the foster family would not also be relational in the natural family.
Justice Stewart in fact indicated affirmatively that the natural family's
right is relational.242
In Moore, of course, only the surrogate parent, not the child, was a
party. The plurality opinion, however, spoke throughout of Moore's
right, not simply as that of a parent to extend her own persona through
her children's children, but as a participatory due process right accru-
ing to her as a member of a family.243 And that right, which the plu-
rality recognized for the extended family, was one that the dissents of
Justices Stewart2' and White245 were willing to attribute at least to the
more traditional nuclear family.
C. PARENT, CHILD, AND THE RELATIONAL INTEREST
1. The Role of the Parents
Not surprisingly, the emphasis on parental rights in the familial rela-
tionship, to the exclusion of whatever interest the child might have in
the relationship's integrity, has increased the willingness of both com-
mentators and courts to advocate state intervention whenever it might
be appropriate to preserve the child's autonomous development with
regard to health, education, or sexual or social maturity. 46 If the pa-
rental interest is merely one in living vicariously through the child, or
in perpetuating for the parents' own sake ideals and customs they find
241. Id. at 850-51 (Brennan, J.).
242. Id. at 862-63 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of
the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason
that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest, I should have little doubt
that the State would have intruded impermissibly on "the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."
Id. (emphasis added).
243. 431 U.S. at 505.
Out of choice, necessity, or a sense of family responsibility, it has been common for close
relatives to draw together and participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a common
home .... Especially in times of adversity, such as the death of a spouse or economic
need, the broader family has tended to come together for mutual sustenance and to
maintain or rebuild a secure home life. This is apparently what happened here.
Id.
244. See id. at 536-37 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
245. See id. at 549-51 (White, J., dissenting).
246. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct.), aff'd, 37 App.
Div. 2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1970), afid, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686
(1972), discussedin Goldstein, Medical Carefor the Child at A2k" On State Supervention of Paren-
talAutonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 644, 665-67 (1977); note 175 supra and authorities cited therein.
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important, the attitude is easy to understand. After all, the mere fact
that the parental interest is constitutionally protected should not mean
that the state cannot intervene to safeguard the child's best interests
against a parental desire for psychological gratification. In the exer-
cise of their rights, parents must, of course, necessarily affect the behav-
ior and thoughts of the child, but it would be fully consistent with a
recognition of the parental right to say that it ends at the point where
the child's rights begin. 47 If, on the other hand, it is assumed that
there is some element of disinterestedness in parental control over the
child's conduct and environment, then it is considerably more difficult
to justify state intervention on the child's behalf as merely rescuing the
child from parental self-aggrandizement.
The real question, given this latter assumption, is whether the par-
ent or the state is better able to determine the child's best interests.
What is important about Moore's and OFFER's recognition of the
child's relational interest in family privacy is its necessary implication
that the answer to that question is the parent, not the state.248
It is the parents who are most familiar with the effects which a
particular decision might have on their child. They are also in the best
position to understand the motives behind a child's wishes and, indeed,
to know what the child's unexpressed wishes are. A family right to
autonomy would maximize the communication between family mem-
bers. Moreover, family members are likely to be more capable than
the state of providing the kind of continuing understanding and care
247. As John Ely has argued in another context, "Dogs [do not] . . . have constitutional
rights, but that does not mean the state cannot prohibit killing them. . . even. , . in the exercise
of the First Amendment right of political protest." Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof:A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 926 (1973).
248. The force of that conclusion is not attenuated by the suggestion in OFFER that foster
families, as well as natural ones, might be entitled to due process protection of their privacy rights.
It is certainly true that by approving New York's administration of its foster family program the
Court indicated that a state could determine the claimants' respective rights of custody, and make
that decision on the basis of the child's best interests. A custody decision by a state, however, is
very different from a state deciding that the child's welfare will be served by a certain medical
treatment, or by public rather than Amish education, or by being able to have an abortion. See
text accompanying notes 143-52 supra. The former decision should be solely a function of "the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role [the
familial relationship] plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children." 431
U.S. at 844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)). The latter, on the other
hand, seeks to maximize the child's possible future choices of ways of life at the expense of those
that the child's custodian would disinterestedly prefer for the child. What OFFER seems to
indicate by confirming the child's constitutional right to noninterference in the familial relation-
ship is that the child has a right to grow up within the pattern-necessarily limited-that his or her
parents think best.
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necessary after any decision has been made that affects the long-term
welfare of the child.
Of course, the issue concerns not merely parent-child relations in
the abstract, but the constitutionality of state support for parental
choices, or the wisdom of state assistance in the child's choice. The
most obvious solution to this Hobson's choice would be for the state to
withdraw from the field of controlling child behavior altogether, per-
mitting child and parents to square off when they disagree and have the
outcome determined by the strength of pre-existing family ties.249 The
difficulty with such a solution is that children too young to break fam-
ily bonds and incompetent to make certain behavioral decisions on
their own behalf may nonetheless defy parental authority and by so
acting compel the state to take a position. An immature child who
makes a contract, attempts to marry, requests medical assistance, or
tries to buy liquor acts within a legal matrix in which his ability to
make a decision will determine the contractual rights or tort liabilities
of third parties. Common law notions, and their statutory embodi-
ments, regarding capacity to contract, informed consent, and the age of
majority reflect a perception that up to a certain point minors are not
capable of making intelligent decisions on their own behalf, and dictate
that until they are, decisions ought to be made for them by some adult.
Such ideas are most commonly implemented not by directions to the
minor or the adult decisionmaker, but by various sanctions imposed on
the third party dealing with the minor."' Given that legal substratum,
the only realistic alternatives are to vest decisionmaking authority in
the parents and support their conclusion, or to provide for the in-
dependent judicial determination of the child's best interests, 25I as oc-
curred in Danforth, Bellotti, and Carey. The family right of
autonomy recognized in Moore and OFFER suggests, however, that
the former alternative is the better one.
249. This solution was suggested in Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75; see Note, supra note 21, at
1017-20.
250. See, e.g., ABA INSTITUTE FOP JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 173, at 110-12;
Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. REv. 462, 466 (1972); Wadlington, Minors and
Health Care: TheAge of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 115-16 (1973); Note, supra note 21,
at I001. See generally A. SussMAN, THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE 222-46 app. B-K (1977).
251. The other possibility would be, of course, to abolish the role of competence and in-
formed consent in the law of contracts and torts, and dispense with any statutory age of majority,
which would amount to throwing the baby out with the bath.
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2. Family Privacy and the Child's Independent Rights
The district court in OFFER concluded that New York's procedure for
removal of a child from a foster home was invalid because, among
other reasons, the "independent review" administrative proceeding was
only available on the request of the foster parents.2 5 2 In rejecting this
argument, the Supreme Court stated that if the foster parents did not
care enough to request a hearing, no interest of the child was invaded
by the removal from the foster home.
2 53
It is surely unobjectionable, even assuming a right of family pri-
vacy, to suppose that the state may intervene on the child's behalf when
the parent, or other custodian, cares not a whit for the child. The more
difficult question raised by the Court's statement concerns the circum-
stances under which the child's disaffection with the parent will justify
the conclusion that family privacy no longer warrants enforcement of
parental decisions on the child's behalf. The issue is not so much at
what point in the child's development he should be considered suffi-
ciently mature to be able to break ties with the family and strike out on
his own. While hard to define, that point is surely reached between
the ages of 12 and 21; isolating its occurrence for each individual re-
quires considerably more psychological insight than can be furnished
here. Rather, the issue is whether it makes sense for the law to posit
for the child both a right to parental direction and a right to make, or
rather to have made by a court, certain decisions over the combined
objections of both state and parents, before the child is sufficiently ma-
ture to sever familial ties. It has already been suggested that deciding
whether an immature minor should have an abortion, or should con-
tinue to attend a public school over her parents' religious objection, is a
task for which the judiciary is especially ill-equipped.254 What has not
been considered is the effect which enforcement of parental decisions
against an unwilling minor will have on the child's development and
relation with his family.
It is important to recognize that in many cases the conflict between
parents and child, despite the minor's forceful objections, will be a false
one. Suppose, for example, a child is afflicted with severe curvature of
the spine. His parents may favor a difficult operation to fuse the spine,
because of the effect they perceive the deformity is having on his emo-
252. OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rey'd sub nom. Smith v.
OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
253. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 850-51 (1977).
254. See notes 153-66 and accompanying text supra.
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tional development and social adjustment in school. The child may
well express opposition to the operation, out of fear, and yet be more
gravely, though less poignantly, disturbed by the daily difficulties that
the deformity presents for him.255 In such a case the minor's opposi-
tion may in fact be a plea for more support in carrying out a decision
which, ultimately, he favors just as his parents do. The principle of
family privacy is perhaps most usefully employed in such "conflict,"
where parents can best perceive the child's uncertainity, and are in a
unique position to assist him in coping with the consequences of the
decision.
When the child's disagreement with a parental choice is more
firmly entrenched, the difficulties inherent in the state aligning with the
parents, or intervening on the child's behalf become most pointed.
The problems are nicely illustrated by a possiblity the Court was able
to avoid in Wisconsin v. Yoder." 6 There the Court held that the state
had no parens patriae power to compel Amish children to attend secon-
dary school against the religious wishes of their parents. Justice Doug-
las, dissenting in part, suggested that if the children had no such
scruples, and in fact wanted to attend school, a proper recognition of
their right to religious freedom would require a court to align itself with
the children, rather than with their parents. 57 Such a conflict becomes
intractable because the position chosen by the children-whatever their
age or maturity-far from being irrational, is one to which the great
majority of us would subscribe.
If one begins by assuming that the eighth-grade student is not suf-
ficiently mature to decide the future course of his education autono-
mously there are several reasons why the principle of family privacy
provides the most acceptable solution. It bears repetition that a judi-
cial decision purportedly in the child's best interest entails severe com-
plications in collecting relevant information, making a prediction as to
the minor's future behavior, and most particularly in choosing values
on which to base a decision as to his "best" interests.
One suggestion that attempts to avoid the problem of value
choices would weigh the possible decisions according to the probability
that they would advance the child's capacity for individual auton-
255. Cf In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 349-50, 292 A.2d 387, 392-93 (1972) (minor's wishes held
entitled to consideration in determining whether to order spinal fusion operation over parents'
religious objection).
256. 406 U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972).
257. Id. at 241-43.
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omy,258 his capacity to choose what his parents might not have chosen
for him or for themselves. 9 The commitment to individual autonomy
is of course no less than a commitment to the puritan ethic or hedon-
ism, a choice for a particular value.260  As applied to the situation
which Yoder almost presented, however, such an approach would per-
mit the child, within limits, to begin to exercise his own ability to hold
an independent view by choosing a commitment widely shared in
America: public education. Selection of autonomy as the decisional
criterion also seems to sidestep the very real possibility that state inter-
vention on the child's behalf will ultimately lead to the standardization
of youth that was condemned in Meyer v. Nebraska.261
Such a solution conflicts with any wholehearted commitment to
the notion of familial privacy recognized in Moore and OFFER; on
the other hand, it seems consistent with the indications in Danforth,
Bellotti, and Carey that the due process clause affords even the imma-
ture minor a right to express and have heard his views regarding signif-
icant life-choices. For these reasons, it appears that the effort to
augment individual autonomy in parent-child conflicts might ulti-
mately be self-defeating; and any such attempt would undoubtedly un-
dermine significant values that can be preserved only by maintaining
family integrity until the child reaches psychological, if not chronolgi-
cal, maturity. In the first place, intervention on the child's behalf only
when he appeals, over parental objection, to otherwise widely shared
social values is likely to lead to the standardization of behavior among
the young.262 The state's decision to intervene on behalf of parent or
child will ultimately tilt toward the lesser nonconformity. Apart from
this, autonomy in the future adult may best be ensured not by giving
the child a potentially decisive vote in all crucial decisionmaking
processes at an early age, but by providing the child with the security of
a stable environment with relatively constant values which may serve
258. See Burt, supra note 83, at 124-26.
259. See generally E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963).
260. Burt, the author of this suggestion, quite perceptively recognizes this himself. Burt,
supra note 83, at 230.
261. 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the
males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to
official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of
great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were wholly
different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that
any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing
violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.
ld.
262. See id.
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as a pattern for identification and a safe target for aggression.263 To be
sure, there is little hope of fostering genuine independence if the child
is excluded altogether from family councils and not informed of the
justifications for her parents' conclusions. On the other hand, the ex-
tent of the autonomy given must be appropriate to the child's age, with
the parents retaining ultimate control.2"
Perhaps even more significantly, permitting the immature child to
seek state intervention to oppose parental choices deprives him of one
of the primary benefits that Moore and OFFER attributed to the fa-
milial relationship: "the role it plays in 'promo[ting] a way of life'
through the instruction of children. ' 265 This notion encompasses more
than the mere socialization and education of the young so that they
may become productive and well-adjusted participants in society. Any
of numerous types of upbringing can satisfactorily accomplish that
task. The nonfungible components of the familial relationship are
rather the sense of belonging and having roots in a distinct tradition,
which derive their strength and importance from the fact that they de-
viate in crucial respects from otherwise widely shared social values.
Their importance to the individual is not only that they provide a sense
of identity, different from others, but also that they allow the family to
act as a buffer between the family member and the larger commu-
nity.2
66
Finally, state intervention on any side but that of the parents al-
most necessarily interferes with "the emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association." 67As Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit have observed, although adolescents may give the impression
that they wish a severance of family relationships, any breaks should be
initiated by the adolescents themselves in order not to be perceived as
abandonment or rejection.268
To permit the Amish child to remain in public school over his par-
ents' objection could well result in precisely that sort of rejection; it
would surely strain relations between parent and child to such a degree
that they would become less intimate. To be sure, intervention on the
263. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, supra note 148, at 9-52.
264. Conger, A World They Never Knew: The Family and Social Change, 100 DAEDALUS
1105, 1125-28 (1971).
265. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977); see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
266. See also R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 212-79 (1969).
267. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 844.
268. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SoLNIT, supra note 148, at 34.
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parents' behalf to permit withdrawal of the child from school will do
nothing to dissolve the child's disaffection with that parental choice. It
is far more likely, however, that he will come to see things their way
than it is that the parents will abandon their notions concerning the
value of a traditional Amish upbringing.
The maturing child always retains, as do the parents, the option of
breaking family ties, and becoming responsible for himself. Until he is
ready to do that, however, the preservation of parental affection is
probably more crucial to his psychological development than is the
type of education which he receives. As long as the family remains
intact, the rights of a child are best protected by state support of paren-
tal decisions, whereby the child may receive the full benefit of parental
care and control.
